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Drought, melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise are all 
subsectors of climate change. I have identified these as slow-onset disasters. The purpose 
of this thesis is to determine whether slow-onset disasters are adequately addressed in the 
homeland security discipline. Risk assessments were performed to determine the level of 
risk these types of disasters pose to homeland security. The critical infrastructure lifeline 
sectors—Energy, Communications, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater 
Systems—were chosen for these assessments because of their identified criticality to 
national security. The assessments reveal slow-onset disasters pose varying degrees of 
risk to these sectors. Policy analyses were conducted on the components of the nation’s 
coordinated approach to homeland security. These reveal the homeland security 
discipline does not adequately address slow-onset disasters because of internal 
contradictions. The contradictions are the result of two of the frameworks used in the 
development of homeland security policies—continuity heuristic and probabilistic 
thinking. These frameworks lead disaster-consequence planners to consider the 
probability and magnitude of a disaster based on a retro-focused approach. Based upon 
my findings, I recommend that possibilistic reasoning (anticipating the worst that could 
happen), coupled with a future-focused approach, be used to develop homeland security 
policies that will fully address the emerging threats posed by slow-onset disasters. 
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Climate change has been an area of concern for the scientific community since the 
early 1900s. Today, trends associated with this phenomenon are receiving more attention 
as potential threats to homeland security. This is substantiated by conclusions from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Strategic Foresight Initiative, the 
Obama administration’s climate change initiatives, and findings in the 2010 and 2014 
issues of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. I have identified a subset of these 
trends as slow-onset disasters that warrant further attention by disaster consequence 
planners—drought, melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise. There is no 
single definition for slow-onset disasters. In the absence of a single and widely accepted 
definition, I have defined a slow-onset disaster as one that takes years to materialize, 
demonstrates early warning signs, and has cascading consequences beyond primary 
impact zones. 
B. SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS AS A THREAT TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
Historical records show that drought, melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, and 
sea-level rise are natural and cyclical events that occur throughout the Earth’s history. 
The early inhabitants of the United States escaped the consequences of these events by 
migrating to other parts of the country. However, population growth and advancements in 
modern engineering have resulted in the construction of permanent infrastructure in areas 
that would have previously required a migratory existence. This practice results in an 
increasing number of people and permanent infrastructure in areas that are most 
vulnerable to the direct and indirect threats posed by slow-onset disasters. Despite this 
reality, these types of disasters do not receive much attention from homeland security 
professionals as a discrete set of threats. This awareness led me to research and ascertain 
whether or not ocean acidification, melting Arctic ice, drought, and sea-level rise pose a 
threat to the nation’s security.  
 xviii 
The nation’s critical infrastructure lifeline sectors—Communications, Energy, 
Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems—are the subjects for these 
assessments. The lifeline sectors were chosen because they are identified by the National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council as “indispensable services that enable the continuous 
operation of critical business and government functions, and would risk human health 
and safety or national and economic security if compromised or not promptly restored.”1 
The results of my assessments reveal ocean acidification poses a low risk and drought 
poses a high risk to each of the lifeline sectors. Melting Arctic ice poses a medium risk to 
the Energy Sector but a low risk to the Communications, Transportation Systems, and 
Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors. Sea-level rise poses a medium risk to the 
Communications and Transportation Systems Sectors, a high risk to the Water and 
Wastewater Systems, and a very high risk to the Energy Sector. 
C. ANALYSES OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICIES 
I performed policy analyses to determine whether or not slow-onset disasters are 
adequately addressed by the homeland security discipline. The results reveal the nation’s 
coordinated approach to homeland security includes legislation and policy directives that 
support achieving the National Preparedness Goal, but they also reveal internal 
contradictions. For example, the Stafford Act identifies a major disaster as “any natural 
catastrophe…in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President 
causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance 
under this Act.”2 However, the implementing principles for the Stafford Act in the Code 
of Federal Regulations limits disaster assistance to damages that occurred during “the 
incident period or was in anticipation of that incident.”3 This precludes slow-onset 
disasters from receiving a disaster declaration under the Stafford Act because their slow 
emergence makes it difficult if not impossible to determine a definite beginning and 
                                                 
1 “Strengthening Regional Resilience, Final Report and Recommendations,” National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council, November 21, 2013, 14, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/niac-
regional-resilience-final-report-11-21-13-508.pdf. 
2 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) Pub. L. No, 93–288, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., 2, accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1383153669955-21f970b19e8eaa67087b7da9f4af706e/stafford_act_booklet_042213_508e.pdf. 
3 Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 CFR §206.32(f) (2002).  
 xix 
ending point. This characteristic also excludes slow-onset disasters from consideration in 
the Strategic National Risk Assessment. Additionally, only 22 percent of the $1.6 billion 
of the Fiscal Year 2016 federal preparedness grants can be used for slow-onset disasters, 
despite climate change having been being identified in the 2015 National Security 
Strategy as “an urgent and growing threat to our national security…contributing to 
increased natural disasters.”4 The remaining funding is limited to protecting our borders, 
direct counter-terrorism activities, or for activities “where a nexus to terrorism exists.”5 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
My research on the work of three experts in the field of homeland security—
Claire Rubin, Donald Kettl, and Kathleen Tierney—reveals the development of homeland 
security policies follow a retro-focused approach based on the events of the last great 
disaster. In one case, our experience with natural disasters has led to the expectation that 
disasters always have a distinct incident period. In the other, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
created an environment in which the availability of resources to counter the threats of 
terrorism far surpasses those for natural disasters. Federal policies are also framed using 
probabilistic thinking rather than possibilistic reasoning, and focuses primarily on a 
“socially constructed likelihood of disaster.”6 This perspective leads disaster planners to 
consider the likelihood of an occurrence without also contemplating the worst that could 
happen (possibilistic reasoning).  
FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative and President Obama’s climate change 
initiatives indicate that slow-onset disasters may yet receive recognition as a subset of 
climate change warranting further attention. However, the previous frameworks used for 
the development of homeland security policies must be reconsidered when addressing 
slow-onset disasters. These disasters require a future-focused rather than a retro-focused 
                                                 
4 “National Security Strategy,” The White House, February 2015, 12, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.  
5 “Notice of Funding Opportunity, Fiscal Year 2016 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP),” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2, accessed April 23, 2016, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1455569937218-3daa3552913b8affe0c6b5bc3b448635/FY_2016_HSGP_NOFO_FINAL.pdf.  
6 Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). Kindle edition.  
 xx 
approach, especially when considering the emerging drivers for change identified by the 
Strategic Foresight Initiative. Disaster planning must use possibilistic reasoning to 
anticipate the consequences of slow-onset disasters that span large geographic areas and 
cross jurisdictional boundaries. This will require planning beyond a local perspective, 
otherwise “an uncoordinated approach to [climate change] adaptation in the United States 
would result in a patchwork of activities that may lead to unintended consequences, 
conflicting mandates, and potential maladaptations.”7  
  
                                                 
7 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Adapting to the Impacts of Climate 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change impacts—ranging from more frequent and severe storms, 
floods, heat waves, and wildfires, to increased risk of asthma attacks and 
longer allergy seasons—already affecting our security, our economy, and 
our communities. In 2012 alone, the cost of weather disasters exceeded 
$110 billion in the United States, and climate change will only increase 
the frequency and intensity of these events. 
—President Barack Obama 
A. OPENING DISCUSSION 
In June 2013, President Obama released his comprehensive plan to reduce the 
impacts of climate change. State-by-state reports were also published, identifying current 
and anticipated impacts of extreme weather events related to climate change.1 Natural 
disasters, pandemics, and trends associated with climate change are also identified as 
threats to homeland security in The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 
published on June 18, 2014. The review stated: 
Pandemic disease, hurricanes, and other natural disasters not only have the 
potential to cause severe consequences, including fatalities and economic 
loss, but also may overwhelm the capacities of critical infrastructure, 
causing widespread disruption of essential services across the country.2  
The relationship of these types of events to homeland security is made clearer 
when viewed from the perspective of the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review’s 
definition of homeland security: “A concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is 
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, 
1 “State-by-State Reports: President Obama’s Plan to Cut Carbon Pollution and Prepare for 
Consequences of Climate Change,” The White House, accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2013/06/26/state-state-reports-president-obamas-plan-cut-carbon-pollution-and-prepare-
consequen#states. 
2 “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 
18, 2014, 22, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/qhsr/2014-QHSR.pdf. 
2 
aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”3 Table 1 is a summary of the data presented in 
the state-by-state reports. 
Table 1.   Impacts of Extreme Weather Events by Region4 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III5 announced 
on April 13, 2014, that their findings reveal global efforts to mitigate the results of 
climate change have not been enough to “avert profound risks in coming decades.”6 The 
global consequences of this finding “could produce drastic effects, such as the collapse of 
ice sheets, a rapid rise in sea levels, difficulty growing enough food, huge die-offs of 
forests, and the mass extinctions of plant and animal species.”7 If it is true that we cannot 
avert these risks, then how equipped are we to address their consequences?  
3 “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2010, 13, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/2010-qhsr-report.pdf. 
4 Adapted from “State-by-State Reports: President Obama’s Plan to Cut Carbon Pollution and Prepare 
for Consequences of Climate Change,” The White House, accessed April 4, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/26/state-state-reports-president-obamas-plan-cut-carbon-
pollution-and-prepare-consequen#states. 
5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the international body for assessing the 
science related to climate change. Excerpted from the “IPCC Factsheet: What Is the IPCC?,” accessed 
April 13, 2014, http://ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/factsheets/FS_what_ipcc.pdf. 
6 Justin Gillis, “Climate Efforts Falling Short, U.N. Panel Says,” New York Times, April 13, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/science/earth/un-climate-panel-warns-speedier-action-is-needed-to-
avert-disaster.html?_r=0. 
7 Gillis, “Climate Efforts Falling Short, U.N. Panel Says.” 
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My subsequent search for an answer to this question led me to identify a subset of 
extreme weather events from the president’s state-by-state reports that share the similar 
characteristics of slow emergence and cascading consequences beyond their primary 
impact zones: melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, water shortage/drought, and sea 
level rise/coastal flooding. While these events are studied extensively by the scientific 
community, they have not received much attention from disaster management 
professionals as a discrete set of threats to our nation. Instead, planning efforts for fast-
onset disasters, such as hurricanes, flash floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, and wildfires are 
the primary subjects for their attention. Further research also indicates no generally 
accepted definition for slow-emerging disasters is being used within the United States. 
However, in contrast, these types of events are widely referenced by the international 
community as slow-onset disasters. 
The World Health Organization identifies slow-onset disasters as “disasters that 
take a long time to produce emergency conditions, for instance natural disasters such as 
drought or socio-economic decline, which are normally accompanied by early warning 
signs.”8 The International Red Cross identifies them as events that “occur over time and 
slowly deteriorate a society’s and a population’s capacity to withstand the effects of the 
hazard or threat.”9 The definition most often used is that of the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: “one that does not emerge from a single, 
distinct event but one that emerges gradually over time, often based on a confluence of 
different events.”10 In the absence of a single definition, I define a slow-onset disaster as 
one that takes years to materialize, demonstrates early warning signs, and has cascading 
consequences beyond primary impact zones. 
                                                 
8 “Definitions: Emergencies,” World Health Organization, accessed January 31, 2015, 
http://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/. 
9 “Introduction to Disaster Preparedness: Disaster Preparedness Training Programme,” International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 8, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.ifrc.org/Global/
Publications/disasters/all.pdf. 
10 “OCHA and Slow-onset Emergencies,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Policy Development and Studies Branch, OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing Series: Brief No. 6, 
April 29, 2011, 3, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ 
OCHA_OPB_SlowOnsetEmergencies190411.pdf. 
 4 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I identified slow-onset disasters as a subset of the severe weather events included 
in Table 1 and conducted further research to answer the overarching question: Are slow-
onset disasters adequately addressed within the homeland security discipline? Three 
questions are asked in order to determine the answer: 
1) What are the characteristics and consequences of slow-onset disasters? 
2) Do their consequences rise to the level of a homeland security threat? 
3) Do current homeland security policies integrate consideration of slow-onset 
disasters? 
 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to identify sources of information for 
researching slow-onset disasters, disaster consequence management, and the homeland 
security discipline. The following are relevant samples of literature that are used for this 
thesis.  
1. Disaster Consequence Management Literature 
Several publications were consulted to gain a deeper understanding of the 
evolution of disaster consequence management in the United States. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency Publication 1 provides a concise history of major events 
that contributed to the development of the emergency management discipline. This 
information was then verified by supporting evidence found in Rutherford H. Platt’s 
Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events, William L. Waugh’s 
Living with Hazards Dealing with Disasters: An Introduction to Emergency 
Management, and Dennis Mileti’s Disasters by Design. When viewed from a historical 
perspective, a correlation between major disasters and changes to legislation, strategies, 
policies, and practice in disaster consequence management becomes evident. This cause 
and effect model is primarily based on fast-onset disasters.  
Disaster consequence management policies are also influenced by underlying 
points of view that frame their development. An understanding of three of these 
frameworks was gained from reading Claire Rubin’s “Introduction: 110 Years of Disaster 
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Response in and Emergency Management in the United States” in Emergency 
Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010, Kathleen Tierney’s The Social 
Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience, and Donald Kettl’s System 
Under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance. The works of these three 
experts in the field of homeland security reveal the practice of disaster consequence 
management takes a retro-focused approach and is primarily influenced by social 
concepts of risk perception and the reactions of policy systems to stress caused by 
disasters. 
2. Scientific/Statistical Research  
Data retrieved from the National Archives was also used to verify information 
related to the development of disaster consequence management within the United States. 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Change website contains multiple 
resources for researching indicators and the projected outcomes and impacts of climate 
change. A copy of the report Climate Change Indicators in the United States, 2012 was 
used to identify additional sources for research material on slow-onset disasters. Other 
information for identifying these sources was gleaned from the White House’s State-by-
State Reports, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) data 
on billion dollar disasters caused by severe weather as a result of climate change. 
Information on drought conditions was taken from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln’s 
National Drought Mitigation Center and the U.S. Drought Portal websites. Drought 
disaster declarations under the Robert T. Stafford were identified in the FEMA Disaster 
Declarations Summary—Open Government Dataset. 
Climate Central (www.climatecentral.org) is the website run by an independent 
organization of scientists and journalists involved with researching and reporting on 
climate change and its impact on the American public. This website provides valuable 
information on the phenomenon of sea-level rise in its Surging Seas analysis module and 
collection of climate change research material. The National Snow and Data Center 
website was used to retrieve data, graphs, and maps to gain an understanding of the 
extent of melting Arctic ice and threats to the Alaska population’s economic, social, and 
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cultural stability. Research on ocean acidification was conducted using the University of 
Washington’s Environmental Visualization tool and NOAA’s website. 
3. Homeland Security Policies for Slow-Onset Disasters 
Research was also conducted to determine the level of policymaker recognition of 
the slow-onset disaster phenomenon and the status of policies and programs related to 
their occurrence. In the case of ocean acidification, the Congressional Research Service 
publication Ocean Acidification by Upton and Folger states “legislative attention to ocean 
acidification has focused on authorizing, funding, and coordinating research to increase 
knowledge about ocean acidification and its potential effects on marine ecosystems.”11  
Information on melting ice in the Arctic was gathered from Changes in the Arctic: 
Background and Issues for Congress. The ramifications of melting Arctic sea ice were 
identified for the following areas: weather patterns, endangered species (on-shore and 
aquatic animals), access to newly available mineral and oil reserves, potential foreign 
territorial claims for emerging land mass, commercial shipping, and national security.12 
All of these have the potential to cause significant negative impacts on the economy, 
health, and culture of the indigenous population. 
In spite of the growing concerns regarding drought conditions in the United 
States, no national comprehensive drought strategy exists as they do for flooding, wild 
fires, and hurricanes. The reason is identified in the Congressional Research Service 
report, Drought in the United States: Causes and Issues for Congress, which states: 
“developing a national policy would be challenging because of split federal and 
nonfederal responsibilities; the existing patchwork of federal programs; and differences 
in regional conditions, risks, and available responses.”13  
                                                 
11 Harold F. Upton and Peter Folger, Ocean Acidification (CRS Report No. R40143) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40143.pdf. 
12 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. 
R41153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41153.pdf. 
13 Peter Folger, Betsy A. Cody and Nicole T. Carter, Drought in the United States: Causes and Issues 
for Congress (CRS Report No. RL34580) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1, 
September 21, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34580.pdf. 
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Research was also performed on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002—two of the primary 
enabling legislations for disaster consequence management in the United States. These 
legislations and their ancillary policies and programs were analyzed to determine their 
applicability to slow-onset disasters.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(1) Object/Sample 
The subject of this thesis is to conduct research on four slow-onset disasters—
melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, water shortage/drought, and sea level rise/coastal 
flooding—that comprise a subset of the larger climate change phenomenon. I explore 
their characteristics and consequences, whether they rise to the level of a homeland 
security threat, and how they are addressed by disaster management policies. 
(2) Selection 
Melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, water shortage/drought, and sea-level rise/
coastal flooding were selected for further research because they already impact the 
Continental United States and are less studied by disaster management planners. The 
National Critical Infrastructure Lifeline Sectors were chosen for an assessment to 
determine the level of risk slow-onset disasters pose to these sectors, due to the dire 
consequences a failure of one or more these sectors poses to national security. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s risk assessment process is used because this 
evaluation tool is: 1) broadly used in the field of disaster management for hazard 
identification, vulnerability, and risk assessments, and 2) customizable to the subject of 
this thesis. 
(3) Limits 
The focus of this thesis is limited to naturally occurring events within the 
Continental United States and homeland security policies that are in place to address 
disaster consequence management. I use a standardized and generally accepted risk 
assessment tool to evaluate these events’ potential to be threats to homeland security. 
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Throughout this thesis, references to drought include issues related to water shortage, and 
those related to sea-level rise include coastal flooding.  
(4) Data Sources 
Open-source, secondary literature, and published data and statistics are used as 
data sources. 
(5) Type and Mode of Analysis 
An exploratory study was undertaken to identify the characteristics and causes, 
consequences, and implications of slow-onset disasters for homeland security. Next, the 
16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors (Figure 1), including those identified as lifeline sectors, 
were reviewed to gain an understanding of their importance to the nation’s security. This 
was followed by a risk assessment to ascertain the vulnerability of the lifeline sectors to 
ocean acidification, melting Arctic ice, sea-level rise, and drought. The results of the 
assessment led to an analysis of current disaster policies to determine the evolution of 
homeland security policies in the United States and the relevance of these policies to 
slow-onset disasters. Next, additional research was conducted to identify the underlying 
frameworks that are used to develop homeland security policies and to determine whether 
or not there are indicators that slow-onset disasters are initiating changes within the 
homeland security discipline.  
(6) Output 
The output of this thesis is the compilation of the result of relevant research, risk 
assessments, and policy analyses to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
slow-onset disasters and their implications for homeland security policies.  
F. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II provides a background on slow-onset disasters, their characteristics and 
consequences, and the emerging threats they pose to the nation. An overview of the 
National Critical Infrastructure Sectors is the subject of Chapter III, while Chapter IV 
presents the results of my risk assessment to determine whether or not slow-onset 
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disasters pose a threat to these sectors. Chapter V provides an analysis of current and 
emerging homeland security policies and their relevance to slow-onset disasters. Three 
frameworks used in the development of homeland security policies are discussed in 
Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter VII presents findings, recommendations, and areas for 
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II. A PRIMER ON SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS  
Where on the face of the earth can we find a spot, on which close 
investigation will not discover signs of that endless cycle of change, to 




Historical records show melting Arctic ice, ocean acidification, sea-level rise, and 
drought are part of the Earth’s natural formative process and have occurred throughout its 
history. Early inhabitants of the Continental United States escaped similar events by 
migrating such as the native populations of the Southwest and the central and lower 
Mississippi Valley did during pre-historic megadroughts.14 Studies have also shown that 
migration was an adaptive response for the peoples of the Arctic region for thousands of 
years.15 Were it not for the threats they pose to our modern way of life, these naturally 
occurring events could remain an area of study primarily within the realm of the scientific 
community.  
Population growth in the United States coupled with advancement in modern 
engineering has made it possible for permanent infrastructure to be constructed in areas 
that would previously have required a migratory existence. For instance, transportation, 
water management systems, levees, dredging, and landfills have resulted in the 
development of vast areas that had previously been inhabitable. Advances in irrigation 
and modern growing practices have also allowed the expansion of agriculture into areas 
that were once deserts. Modern fishing vessels, global positioning systems (GPS), and 
fish finders have enhanced the capabilities of the fishing fleets that support the seafood 
industry in the United States. Paradoxically, these advances have also increased the 
                                                 
14 Edward R. Cook et al., “North American Drought: Reconstructions, Causes, and Consequences,” 
Earth-Science Reviews 81, (2007): 93–134, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0012825206001784. 
15 Elizabeth Ferris, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples 
(Washington, DC: Brookings-LSE, Project on Internal Displacement, 2013), 4, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/30-arctic-ferris/30-arctic-ferris-paper.pdf. 
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vulnerability of communities to the direct and indirect threats posed by slow-onset 
disasters.  
This chapter provides documented information that slow-onset disasters threaten 
“American interests, aspirations, and way of life.”16 Some data is predictive in nature, 
based on emerging trends that indicate their potential impacts to the cultural, social, and 
economic stability of the American people. Other information is historical and documents 
events that have already occurred. The findings presented in this chapter indicate that the 
consequences of slow-onset disasters warrant further attention as posing significant 
threats to our nation’s security. 
B. WHAT ARE SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS AND WHY SHOULD WE 
CARE? 
1. Ocean Acidification  
The world’s oceans absorb approximately 25 percent of the carbon dioxide (CO2) 
that is present in the atmosphere. As this concentration increases so does the level of CO2 
in the oceans. Higher levels of CO2 in the oceans lowers pH levels and increases acidity. 
This increased acidity negatively impacts calcifying species such as “oysters, clams, sea 
urchins, shallow water corals, deep sea corals, and calcareous plankton.”17 These 
organisms are important links in the ocean’s food chain and their loss threatens not only 
marine life who depend on it for food, but also the lives of those who depend on it for 
their sustenance and livelihood.18 
                                                 
16 “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 13. 
17 “What Is Ocean Acidification?,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Pacific Marine 




Oceanographic studies show evidence of ocean acidification dating back to the 
Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum event.19 Scientists credit this as the cause of “a 
sudden ‘dissolution event’ in which so much of the shelled sea life disappeared that the 
sediment changed from primarily white calcium carbonate ‘chalk’ to red-brown mud.”20 
The implication of this finding is that “seawater became so corrosive that it ate away at 
the shells, along with other species with calcium carbonate in their bodies. It took 
hundreds of thousands of years for the oceans to recover from this crisis, and for the sea 
floor to turn from red back to white.”21  
Other studies reveal “in the past 200 years alone, ocean water has become 30 
percent more acidic—faster than any known change in ocean chemistry in the last 50 
million years.”22 Additionally, polar ice core samples from Greenland and Antarctica 
show the acidity of the oceans is the highest it has been in the last 800,000 years.23 This 
in part is exacerbated by waste from industrial and agricultural enterprises, either 
introduced by direct runoff from adjacent facilities in heavily populated coastal areas or 
carried long distances by rivers flowing into estuaries and coastal waters.24  
Although ocean acidification is a relatively new area of study, research has shown 
that “while the ultimate consequences are still unknown, there is a risk of ecosystem 
changes that threaten coral reefs, fisheries, protected species, and other natural resources 
                                                 
19 “The Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) is one of the most intense and abrupt intervals 
of global warming in the geological record. It occurred around 56 million years ago, at the boundary 
between the Paleocene and Eocene epochs.” Phil Jardine, “Patterns in Palaeontology: The Paleocene-
Eocene Thermal Maximum,” accessed January 24, 2015, http://www.palaeontologyonline.com/articles/
2011/the-paleocene-eocene-thermal-maximum/. 
20 “Ocean Acidification,” Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History, accessed January 24, 
2015, http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-acidification. 
21 Carl Zimmer, “An Ominous Warning on the Effects of Ocean Acidification,” Yale environment360, 
accessed January 24, 2015, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
an_ominous_warning_on_the__effects_of_ocean_acidification/2241/. 
22 “Ocean Acidification,” Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History. 
23 “Ocean Acidification,” Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, accessed November 17, 2014, 
http://www.whoi.edu/main/topic/ocean-acidification. 
24 Hedia Adelsman and Laura Whitely Binder, eds., Ocean Acidification: From Knowledge to Action, 
Washington State’s Strategic Response (Publication no. 12–01-015) (Olympia, WA: Washington State Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, 2012), 12–13, http://pmel.noaa.gov/co2/files/
wa_state_blue_ribbon_panel_oa_11-27-2012.pdf. 
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of value to society.”25 Based on statistics published in the Fisheries of the United States 
2013,26 this value to society in the United States is an estimated $86.5 billion spent on 
fishery products including $57.9 billion at food service establishments. Overall, in 2013, 
“the commercial marine fishing industry contributed $43.6 billion (in value added) to the 
U.S. Gross National Product.”27  
Alaska’s fisheries produce “almost 50% of the nation’s seafood harvest.”28 This 
geographic area is also of major importance to Alaskan populations because “the Bering 
Sea is directly or indirectly the source of over 25 million pounds of subsistence food for 
Alaska residents, primarily Alaska natives in small coastal communities.”29  
Ocean acidification poses not only a threat to the food supply but also the cultural 
stability of Alaskan natives. Subsistence harvesting has been practiced for thousands of 
years and is an important part of the cultural identity of the indigenous population. They 
“have relied upon the traditional harvest of wild foods for thousands of years and have 
passed this way of life, its culture, and values down through generations.”30 
Ocean acidification also threatens sea life along the Pacific coast of the United 
States. A report published by the Washington State Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification 
discusses what this threat means to Washington’s “marine economy, cultures, and 
environment.”31 According to the report, the seafood industry generates 42,000 jobs and 
contributes more than $1.7 billion in gross profits and employment in Washington. 
                                                 
25 “Ocean Acidification: A National Strategy to Meet the Challenges of a Changing Ocean,” National 
Research Council of the National Academies (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), 96, 
accessed November 17, 2014, http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id=12904. 
26 Alan Lowther and Michael Liddel, eds. Fisheries of the United States 2013 (Silver Spring, MD: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service Office of Science 
and Technology, 2014), v, http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/commercial/fus/fus13/01_front2013.pdf. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Adrienne J. Sutton, ed. NOAA Ocean and Great Lakes Acidification Research Plan (NOAA Ocean 
Acidification Steering Committee, 2010), 32, http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/files/
feel3500_without_budget_rfs.pdf. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Federal Subsistence Management Program,” U.S. Department of the Interior, accessed September 
10, 2015, https://www.doi.gov/subsistence. 
31 Adelsman and Binder, eds., Ocean Acidification, 3.  
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Additionally, $3 million was collected for state licenses to harvest wild shellfish, and 
recreational oyster and clam harvesters contributed an additional $27 million to the local 
economy.32 
In 2007, Oregon’s oyster larvae were dying by the millions both in Willapa Bay 
and in hatchery tanks. An investigation into the cause revealed ocean acidification 
conditions that exist in colder waters at the ocean bottom were rising closer to the surface 
along the West Coast upwelling zones.33 This phenomenon also threatens the oyster and 
abalone industries in California.  
According to an article published in 2011, the coast of Maine produces more than 
105 million pounds of lobster valued at more than $334 million along with 33 million 
pounds of other types of shellfish with an estimated market value of $22 million.34 The 
same article also identified a potential loss of $1 billion for the Maine economy related to 
ocean acidification.35 This threat is not limited to the Maine seafood industry. It will 
impact all the communities along the Gulf of Maine, the mid-Atlantic region, and the 
Gulf Coast region. In 2012, the Gulf Coast—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, 
and West Florida—generated over $21.82 billion in annual sales from the sea food 
industry that also supported 159.9 million jobs.36 
2. Melting Arctic Ice  
Historical data is not available for the impacts melting Arctic ice has on human 
systems. However, ample research is available for the expansion and contraction of sea 
                                                 
32 Adelsman and Binder, eds., Ocean Acidification, 3–5.  
33 “Upwelling occurs when winds blowing across the ocean surface often push water away from an 
area. When this occurs, water rises up from beneath the surface to replace the diverging surface water. This 
process is known as upwelling,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Ocean 
Service Education,” accessed January 26, 2015, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/currents/
03coastal4.html. 
34 “Ocean Acidification: What It Is and Why It Matters Along the Maine Coast,” The Island Institute, 
accessed February 8, 2015, www.islandinstitute.org/files/Ocean+Acidification.pdf/853/. 
35 Ibid. 
36 “Fisheries Economics of the U.S. 2012, Gulf of Mexico,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Office of Science and Technology, National Marine Fisheries Service, accessed January 
24, 2015. 121. http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/economics/documents/feus/2012/
FEUS2012_GulfofMexico.pdf. 
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ice in the Arctic. Using proxy data,37 paleoclimatologists have determined that large ice 
sheets formed in the polar regions after “the onset of a long-term climatic cooling that 
followed the Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Maximum.”38 Further study of proxy data and 
satellite images also show Arctic sea ice grows and contracts based on seasonal changes. 
The ice reaches its maximum extent in March and then begins a melting process that 
continues until the start of winter in September. Studies from the mid-19th century 
indicate the Arctic region “reached the highest temperatures in at least the last two 
thousand years.”39 Other studies indicate that the Arctic could have ice-free summers by 
the year 2040.40  
This melting of the ice fields has far-reaching ramifications beyond the Arctic 
region as it contributes to sea-level rise and increases the frequency of extreme weather 
events. Sea level increases when water from the ice melt enters the ocean.41 A larger 
expanse of the ocean surface is exposed when the ice fields melt, and as the sun warms 
this darker unexposed area, the water molecules expand and also contribute to sea-level 
rise. This phenomenon accounts for 40 percent of the sea-level rise over the last 35 
years.42 
The absorption of heat and its eventual release into the atmosphere is thought to 
be affecting the North American jet stream, which determines our weather patterns. This 
is believed to result in extreme snowfall, hurricanes, heat waves, and drought. Evidence 
                                                 
37 Proxy data are “natural clues to past climate that are buried in sediments at the bottom of the oceans, 
locked in coral reefs, frozen in glaciers and ice caps, or preserved in the rings of trees.” “Introduction to 
Paleoclimatology,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed January 24, 2015, 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/primer_study.html 
38 Leonid Polyak et al., “History of Sea Ice in the Arctic,” Quaternary Science Reviews 29 (2010): 
1773, accessed January 10, 2015, http://bprc.osu.edu/geo/publications/polyak_etal_seaice_QSR_10.pdf. 
39 Ibid., 1772.  
40 James E. Overland and Muyin Wang, “When Will the Summer Arctic Be Nearly Sea Ice Free?,” 
Geophysical Research Letters 40, (2013), 2097–2101, accessed January 10, 2015, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/grl.50316/full. 
41 Barry G. Rogers, “How Might Sea Level Be Affected by Changes in Land Ice,” National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, accessed January 25, 2015, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/essay_barry.html. 
42 Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T. C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, eds., Highlights of Climate Change 
Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. (Washington, DC: U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, 2014), 60, http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/
NCA3_Highlights_LowRes.pdf?download=1. 
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to support this theory was recently published in the article “Climate Forcing of 
Unprecedented Intense‐Hurricane Activity in the Last 2000 Years” that links sea surface 
temperature rise with intense hurricanes.43  
The people of Alaska are already experiencing negative consequences resulting 
from melting ice fields. Hunting ranges of the indigenous populations have been greatly 
reduced and the “harvesting of animals is likely to become riskier and less predictable 
which may increase food insecurity.”44 Warmer temperatures in the region are also 
causing erosion and coastal flooding and thawing permafrost. According to a report 
published by the Brookings Institution in January 2013, these threats impact 31 Alaskan 
communities with 12 facing relocation.45 Thawing permafrost threatens infrastructures 
such as homes, schools, hospitals, railroads, highways, and airstrips. The Environmental 
Protection Agency reports that approximately 100,000 people live in areas that are 
susceptible to the loss of permafrost.46  
3. Sea Level Rise  
American communities outside of Alaska are also facing the possibility of forced 
relocation due to another slow-onset disaster. Since the early 1900s, sea levels along the 
U.S. coastlines have been rising.47 This phenomenon is caused by a number of factors 
including melting Arctic and Antarctic ice fields, the rising ocean temperatures, and the 
shifting of tectonic plates caused by receding glaciers.48 A 2009 study reveals it “has 
been estimated that 3 feet of sea level rise (within the range of projections for this 
                                                 
43 Jeffrey P. Donnelly et al., “Climate Forcing of Unprecedented Intense Hurricane Activity in the Last 
2000 Years,” Earth’s Future 3, no. 2 (February 2015): 49–65, doi:10.1002/2014EF000274, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1002/2014EF000274/. 
44 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 39.  
45 Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2013), 9–18, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2013/1/30-arctic-alaska-bronen/30-climate-alaska-bronen-paper.pdf. 
46 “Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation,” United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/alaska.html. 
47 “Is Sea Level Rising,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed May 21, 2016, 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/sealevel.html. 
48 “Frequently Asked Questions: What Is Sea Level?,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, accessed March 6, 2015, http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/sltrends/faq.htm#q1. 
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century) would inundate about 65 percent of the coastal marshlands and swamps in the 
contiguous United States.”49 This increase in sea level will also impact barrier islands 
that provide coastal communities protection against hurricanes. Further study indicates 
that by the end of this century, coastal flooding will threaten more than dry land and will 
also impact “some 3 million acres of roads, bridges, commercial buildings, military 
bases, agricultural lands, toxic waste dumps, schools, hospitals, and more.”50  
The 2014 Highlights of Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third 
National Climate Assessment reports that 164 million people reside in coastal counties, 
and this number grows by 1.2 million each year.51  
Cumulative costs to the economy of responding to sea level rise and 
flooding events alone could be as high as $325 billion by 2100 for 4 feet 
of sea level rise, with $130 billion expected to be incurred in Florida and 
$88 billion in the North Atlantic region. The projected costs associated 
with one foot of sea level rise by 2100 are roughly $200 billion. These 
figures do not include losses of valuable ecosystem services, as well as 
indirect losses from business disruption, lost economic activity, impacts 
on economic growth, or other non-market losses.52  
Data gleaned from Climate Central’s Surging Seas online analysis tool reveals the 
value of property located in areas less than 4 feet below the high-tide level is $657 
billion.53 At risk within these areas are 3.37 million people, 1.82 million homes, and 
10.17 million acres of land. Given these statistics, disaster management planners now 
have to consider that 
                                                 
49 Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, eds., Global Climate Change Impacts 
in the United States. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 82, 
http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf.  
50 Ben Strauss, Claudia Tebaldi, and Remik Ziemlinski, “Surging Seas: Sea Level Rise, Storms, and 
Global Warming’s Threat to the U.S. Coast,” Climate Central, 5, accessed November 29, 2014, 
http://slr.s3.amazonaws.com/SurgingSeas.pdf. 
51 Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T. C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, eds., Highlights of Climate Change 
Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. (Washington, DC: U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, 2014), 88, http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/
NCA3_Highlights_LowRes.pdf?download=1. 
52 Ibid., 91. 
53 Data was compiled based on information downloaded from Climate Central’s Surging Seas Sea 
Level Rise analysis tool available at http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/. This tool contains data for the 22 
coastal states. 
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The ocean will flood areas that are currently populated, and it will 
contaminate the ground water of many areas that are close to the new 
coast line but not yet flooded. In the first case, populations will have to 
migrate or drown; in the second, they will lose significant agricultural 
productivity.54  
4. Drought  
Drought is defined by the National Weather Service as “a deficiency in 
precipitation over an extended period, usually a season or more, resulting in a water 
shortage causing adverse impacts on vegetation, animals, and/or people.”55 The impact of 
drought results in both direct and indirect consequences. For instance, the direct impact 
of a reduction in harvested crops results in the indirect consequence of loss of revenue for 
farmers, reduction in tax revenues for the affected community, and increased food 
prices.56  
Drought is the most familiar and studied of the slow-onset disasters. 
Paleoanthropologists and archaeologists credit historical megadroughts as the catalyst for 
the mass migration of the Pueblo people in the Southwestern United States during the 
13th century, and the native population in the central and lower Mississippi Valley in the 
14th through 16th centuries.57  
During the 1930s, four separate drought events occurred in such rapid succession 
that the impacted areas were unable to recover between occurrences. This resulted in 
what is known as the Dust Bowl. Although the agricultural sector of the Great Plains was 
primarily impacted, the cascading effects of the Dust Bowl also “contributed to the Great 
                                                 
54 Rick Bissell, Preparedness and Response for Catastrophic Disasters (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
2013), 17. 
55 “Drought: Public Fact Sheet,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather 
Service, May 2008, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/brochures/climate/
DroughtPublic2.pdf. 
56 Donald A. Wilhite, Mark D. Svoboda, and Michael J. Hayes, “Understanding the Complex Impacts 
of Drought: A Key to Enhancing Drought Mitigation and Preparedness,” Water Resources Management, 21 
(2007), 765, http://www.geo.utexas.edu/courses/387h/Lectures/Drought.pdf. 
57 Cook et al., “North American Drought: Reconstructions, Causes, and Consequences.” 
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Depression’s bank closures, business losses, [and] increased unemployment.”58 Millions 
of people were forced to relocate in search of work, often coming into conflict with the 
existing population in competition for limited jobs.59 Additionally, the poverty and high 
unemployment rate of the migrants overloaded local relief efforts and public health 
systems. It is reported that $525 million were expended in 1934 for the government’s 
relief efforts to alleviate the impacts of the Dust Bowl and the accompanying Great 
Depression.60  
Other droughts of note occurred during the 1950s and 1980s. The 1950s drought 
lasted for five years and was primarily located in the Great Plains and the Southwest. 
This severely impacted the agricultural sector with half of the normal crop yield being 
lost. In the period from 1987 to1989, drought conditions existed in 36 percent of the 
United States. Damages as a result of this three-year event are estimated to be $39 billion. 
More recent events indicate that drought will have dire consequences with researchers 
predicting “the mean state of drought in the late 21st century over the Central Plains and 
Southwest will likely exceed even the most severe megadrought periods of the Medieval 
era.”61 
Drought conditions fluctuated across the Continental United States in the period 
between 2000 and 2014. By the end of 2013, losses from drought ($102 billion/461 
deaths) were surpassed only by severe storms including tornado and hail damage ($110 
billion/927 deaths) and tropical cyclones ($414 billion/2,627 deaths).62 Disaster losses 
                                                 
58 “Drought in the Dust Bowl Years,” University of Nebraska-Lincoln, National Drought Mitigation 
Center, accessed February 1, 2015, http://drought.unl.edu/DroughtBasics/DustBowl/
DroughtintheDustBowlYears.aspx. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “The Dust Bowl’s Legacy,” University of Nebraska-Lincoln, National Drought Mitigation Center, 
accessed February 1, 2015, http://drought.unl.edu/DroughtBasics/DustBowl/TheDustBowlsLegacy.aspx. 
61 Benjamin I. Cook, Toby R. Ault, and Jason E. Smerdon, “Unprecedented 21st Century Drought 
Risk in the American Southwest and Central Plains,” Science Advances 1, no. 1 (2015): 6, doi: 10.1126/
sciadv.1400082.  
62 Compiled with data from “Billion-Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters: Table of Events,” National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, accessed April 26, 2015, 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.  
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for 2014 were not published at the time of this research and, therefore, are not included. 
Table 2 includes drought highlights for the period between 2000 and 2013. 
Table 2.   Drought Impacts for the Years 2000–201363 
 
 
                                                 
63 Adapted from “State of the Climate,” NOAA National Centers for Environmental 
Information, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/. 
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Daniel Griffin and Kevin J. Anchukaitis’s study on the 2012–2014 California 
drought reveals “the current event is the most severe drought in the last 1,200 years, with 
single year (2014) and accumulated moisture deficits worse than any previous continuous 
span of dry years.”64 According to a University of California, Davis study:  
The resulting net water shortage of 1.6 million acre-feet will cause losses 
of $810 million in crop revenue and $203 million in dairy and other 
livestock value, plus additional groundwater pumping costs of $454 
million. These direct costs to agriculture total $1.5 billion. The total 
statewide economic cost of the 2014 drought is $2.2 billion, with a total 
loss of 17,100 seasonal and part-time jobs.65 
The California drought has cascading impacts that reach far beyond the state’s 
borders. In 2014, agriculture products from the state “accounted for accounted for 60 
percent of the U.S. production for fresh-market vegetables, and 73 percent of processed 
vegetables”66 Drought has a significant impact on the economy of the United States as 
agricultural and livestock losses demonstrate. However, dwindling water supplies also 
threaten the National Critical Infrastructure Sectors.67  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a background on slow-onset disasters and their impacts to 
communities within the Continental United States. Ocean acidification, melting Arctic 
ice, sea-level rise, and drought display the characteristics presented in the definition of a 
slow-onset disaster—they take years to materialize, demonstrate early warning signs, and 
have cascading consequences beyond primary impact zones. As shown in this chapter, 
the occurrence of any one of these hazards poses a significant threat to the social, 
cultural, and economic stability of the impacted population. However, further evaluation 
                                                 
64 Daniel Griffin and Kevin J Anchukaitis, “How Unusual Is the 2012–2014 California Drought?,” 
Geophysical Research Letters 41, no. 24 (December 28, 2014): 9017, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu/dow/10.1002/2014GL062433/full. 
65 Richard Howitt et al., Economic Analysis of the 2014 Drought for California Agriculture (Davis, 
CA: Center for Watershed Sciences, University of California-Davis, 2014), ii, 
https://watershed.ucdavis.edu/files/biblio/DroughtReport_23July2014_0.pdf. 
66 “Rain Needed to Bust the Drought,” Climate Central, November 12, 2015, 
http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/maps/rain-needed-to-bust-the-drought. 
67 “Water-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” 2010, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 67–68, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-2010.pdf. 
 23 
was necessary to determine whether or not their occurrences and cumulative 
consequences pose a credible threat to the security of the nation.  
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security identifies the National Critical 
Infrastructure Sectors as critical to our nation’s security. Therefore, these sectors were 
chosen to serve as the subject for this evaluation. The next chapter provides an overview 
of the Critical Infrastructure Sectors and validates the important roles they play in 
ensuring the security of the nation.  
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III. PRIMER ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 
If the workers took a notion they could stop all speeding trains; every ship 
upon the ocean they can tie with mighty chains. Every wheel in the 
creation, every mine and every mill; fleets and armies of the nation, will at 




The United States Department of Homeland Security identifies 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors 
whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are 
considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.68  
The NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
identifies four Critical Infrastructure Sectors—Communications, Energy, Transportation 
Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems—that provide critical lifeline functions for 
all sectors.69 Each of the national critical infrastructure sectors depends on one or more of 
the lifeline sectors.70 This chapter presents an overview of 12 of the critical infrastructure 
sectors and a detailed profile of the lifeline sectors and their level of criticality to the 
security of the nation. 
                                                 
68 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 29, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
69 “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 17, accessed January 30, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
National-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf. 
70 “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience National Research and Development Plan Final 
Report and Recommendations,” National Infrastructure Advisory Council, November 14, 2014, 18, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAC-CISR-RD-Plan-Report-Final-508.pdf. 
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B. NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 
Presidential Policy Directive: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(PPD/21) establishes 16 critical infrastructure sectors.71 Figure 1 identifies these sectors. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Critical Infrastructure Sectors72 
 
 
                                                 
71 “Presidential Policy Directive–Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, Presidential Policy 
Directive/PPD-21,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, accessed January 6, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-
infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
72 Adapted from “What Is Critical Infrastructure?,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed 
January 20, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.  
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1. Chemical Sector 
The Chemical Sector produces “more than 70,000 diverse products that are 
essential to modern life.”73 The Communications, Energy, Information Technology, 
Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems sectors share 
interdependencies with the Chemical Sector.74 This “makes the uninterrupted production 
and transportation of chemicals essential for national and economic security.”75 
According to the 2010 Chemical Sector-Specific Plan, 96 percent of goods manufactured 
in the United States in 2013 depended on products supplied by the chemical sector.76 
2. Commercial Facilities Sector 
The Commercial Facilities Sector includes the real estate industry; and facilities 
for entertainment media, gaming, lodging, outdoor events, public assembly, retail 
enterprises, and sports events. “The majority of facilities have open public access and 
house the business activities and commercial transactions that dominate the U.S. 
economy.”77 The sector is dependent on the Communications, Emergency Services, 
Energy, Food and Agriculture, Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and 
Public Health, Transportation Systems and Water and Waste Water Systems Sectors.78  
                                                 
73 “2015 Chemical Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP, 2013,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2, accessed November 15, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-
chemical-2015-508.pdf. 
74 “2015 Chemical Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 3. 
75 Ibid., 2.  
76 Ibid. 
77 “Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP, 2013,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015 2, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-commercial-
facilities-2015-508.pdf. 
78 Ibid., 3.  
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3. Critical Manufacturing Sector 
The Critical Manufacturing Sector produces primary metals;79 electrical 
equipment, appliances, and components; transportation equipment; aviation and 
aerospace products and parts; and railroad rolling stock.80 The sector “includes the 
manufacturing industries that are the most crucial for the continuity of other critical 
sectors and have significant national economic implications.”81 This statement is 
supported by the American Association of Manufacturers, which reported $2,090.7 
billion was made from manufacturing production in 2014.82 The sector shares 
interdependencies with the Chemical, Communications, Energy, Information 
Technology, Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors.83 
4. Dams Sector 
The Dams Sector provides critical water retention and water control services such 
as irrigation, hydroelectric power generation; water and wastewater management; flood 
control; and river transportation. Its facilities include dams, hydropower plants, 
navigation locks, levees, dikes, hurricane barriers, and industrial waste impoundments.84 
Dams Sector facilities are reported to “irrigate at least 10 percent of U.S. cropland, help 
protect more than 43 percent of the U.S. population from flooding, and generate about 60 
                                                 
79 The Hudson Institute of Minerology defines primary metal as “Metal recovered as a principal or 
byproduct material from the processing of ores; includes metal recovered from ore processing wastes such 
as tailings, and downstream processing wastes such as slags and residues from the smelting and refining of 
the metal. Excludes metal recovered from scrap or its processing wastes (secondary metal),” accessed 
February 10, 2016, http://www.mindat.org/glossary/primary_metal. 
80 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. “railroad rolling stock”: “the wheeled vehicles owned and 
used by a railroad or motor carrier,” accessed January 6, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/rolling%20stock. 
81 “2015 Critical Manufacturing Sector-Specific Plan, An Annex to the NIPP 2013,” U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, iv, accessed May 21, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
nipp-ssp-critical-manufacturing-2015-508.pdf. 
82 “United States Manufacturing Facts,” National Association of Manufacturers, last modified 
December 2015, http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/State-Manufacturing-Data/State-Manufacturing-
Data/December-2015/Manufacturing-Facts--United-States.pdf. 
83 “2015 Critical Manufacturing Sector-Specific Plan, An Annex to the NIPP 2013,” U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 3.  
84 “2015 Dams Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP, 2013,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, v, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-
dams-2015-508.pdf. 
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percent of electricity in the Pacific Northwest.”85 The sector shares interdependencies 
with the Communications; Energy; Food and Agriculture; Transportation Systems; and 
Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors.86 
5. Defense Industrial Base Sector 
The Defense Industrial Base Sector includes activities for “design, production, 
delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or 
parts, to meet U.S. military requirements.”87 Interdependencies for this sector are not 
specifically addressed in the 2010 Defense Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan because 
the defense industrial base “partnership has not addressed commercial infrastructure 
interdependencies in a systematic way.”88 However, the plan does identify the sector’s 
intent to work with other sectors “to better understand and develop solutions to mitigate 
risks associated with critical dependencies/interdependencies and supply chain 
linkages.”89 The plan states this undertaking will begin with the “Oil and Natural Gas, 
Electricity, Water, IT, Communications, and Transportation Systems Sectors and 
Subsectors.”90 (Since the publication of this sector’s specific plan, the sectors and 
subsectors of the Oil and Natural Gas, Electricity Sectors; and Water Sector have been 
combined under the Energy Sector and Water and Wastewater Systems Sector, 
respectively.) 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 “2015 Dams Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP, 2013,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 3.  
87 “2010 Defense Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 11, accessed December 20, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-defense-industrial-base-2010.pdf. 
88 Ibid., 12.  
89 Ibid., 25.  
90 Ibid. 
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6. Emergency Services Sector 
The Emergency Services Sector primarily focuses on prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery.91 This sector “also serves as the primary protector for the other 
15 critical infrastructure sectors.”92 It is comprised of personnel from the public and 
private sectors, non-governmental organizations, faith-based and volunteer organizations 
involved in public safety functions such as the fire service, law enforcement, public 
works, health and social services; emergency medical services, and emergency 
management disciplines.93 This sector is of critical importance to the nation because the 
“incapacitation of any of the assets, networks, or systems in this sector, whether physical 
or virtual, could cause significant harm or loss of life, public health issues, and/or long-
term economic loss.”94 The Communications; Energy; Healthcare and Public Health; 
Information Technology; Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems 
sectors are identified as critical interdependencies for the Emergency Services Sector.95 
7. Financial Services Sector 
The Financial Services Sector is organized and regulated based on the services 
and products it provides. These include: “(1) deposit, consumer credit, and payment 
systems products; (2) credit and liquidity products; (3) investment products; and (4) risk 
transfer products.”96 The organizations that make up the Financial Services Sector “form 
the backbone of the Nation’s financial system and are a vital component of the global 
economy.”97 Most of these services are dependent on information and communication 
                                                 
91 “Emergency Services Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 20, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/emergency-services-sector. 
92 Ibid. 
93 “Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP, 2013,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015 3, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/nipp-ssp-emergency-services-2015-508.pdf. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., 4. 
96 “Financial Services Sector-Specific Plan 2015,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 6, 
accessed May 21, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-financial-services-
2015-508.pdf. 
97 Ibid., 8. 
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technology platforms.98 In addition to Information Technology and Communications, this 
sector also shares interdependencies with the Communications, Energy, and the 
Transportation Systems Sectors.99 
8. Food and Agriculture Sector 
The Food and Agriculture (FA) Sector is concerned with the production, 
processing, and delivery of agricultural and food commodities to the nation and the 
worldwide market. As defined in the Food and Agriculture Sector-Specific Plan, 2015, 
“agriculture comprises establishments primarily engaged in growing crops, raising 
animals, harvesting timber, and harvesting fish and other animals from a farm, ranch, or 
their natural habitats.”100 The FA sector “accounts for roughly one-fifth of the Nation’s 
economic activity. In 2012, total agricultural product sales amounted to $400 billion, with 
crops and livestock each accounting for roughly half the FA Sector.”101
 
The sector has 
“roughly 2.1 million farms, encompassing 915 million acres of land…[and] produce $212 
billion in crop production. The top five cash-producing industries are cattle, poultry and 
eggs, corn, soybeans, and milk.”102
 
The Chemical, Commercial Facilities, 
Communications, Energy, Financial Services, Healthcare and Public Health, Information 
Technology, Transportation Systems, Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors share 
interdependencies with this sector.103 
9. Government Facilities Sector 
The Government Facilities Sector includes facilities that allow public access for 
business and recreational purposes as well as those that are closed to the public because 
                                                 
98 Ibid.  
99 “2010 Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 24, accessed December 26, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-banking-and-finance-2010.pdf.  
100 “Food and Agriculture Sector-Specific Plan, 2015,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 4, 
accessed May 21, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-food-ag-2015-
508.pdf. 
101 Ibid., 2.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 21–22.  
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of security reasons. These facilities may be publicly or privately owned.104 This sector 
does not have a sector-specific plan. Instead, there are “snapshots” published for two of 
its subsectors. The Education Facilities Subsector “covers pre-kindergarten through 12th 
grade schools, institutions of higher education, and business and trade schools” and the 
National Monuments and Icons Subsector with assets that are included in the “National 
Register of Historic Places or the List of National Historic Landmarks.”105 
Interdependencies with the Commercial Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Nuclear 
Reactor, Materials and Waste, and Transportation Systems Sectors are identified for the 
Education Facilities Subsector.106 No interdependencies are identified for the National 
Monuments and Icons Subsector. 
10. Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
The Healthcare and Public Health Sector includes the facilities and personnel that 
provide healthcare, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and equipment; and veterinary and 
mortuary services.107 This sector has “approximately 13 million healthcare personnel 
from many professions.”108 The 2010 Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan 
identifies this sector as having “a crucial role in preparedness and response for all 
hazards. The sector is responsible for mitigating the physical and psychological health 
impacts associated with incidents.”109 The identified interdependencies for this sector are 
the Chemical, Communications, Emergency Services, Energy, Food and Agriculture, 
                                                 
104 A sector-specific annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan for the Government Facilities 
Sector was not available for review. Instead, the presented information is excerpted from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, “Government Facilities Sector,” accessed December 20, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/government-facilities-sector. 
105 Ibid. 
106 “Education Facilities Subsector Snapshot,” Interdependencies for the Education Facilities 
Subsector are excerpted from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 20, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd/nppd-ip-education-facilities-snapshot-2011.pdf. 
107 “2010 Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 9–10, accessed December 29, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-healthcare-and-public-health-2010.pdf. 
108 Ibid., 10. 
109 Ibid. 
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Information Technology, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems 
Sectors.110 
11. Information Technology Sector 
The Information Technology Sector is “a functions-based sector that comprises 
not only physical assets but also virtual systems and networks that enable key capabilities 
and services in both the public and private sectors.”111 Unlike the other critical 
infrastructure sectors it is not “composed of finite and easily identifiable physical 
assets.”112 The sector is further defined by its lack of geographic or political boundaries. 
No specific interdependencies are identified in this sector’s specific plan. However, the 
following statement related to interdependencies was found on the Information 
Technology Sector webpage:  
The Information Technology Sector is central to the nation’s security, 
economy, and public health and safety. Businesses, governments, 
academia, and private citizens are increasingly dependent upon 
Information Technology Sector functions.113  
12. Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector 
The Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector is composed of 
Commercial nuclear power plants; non-power reactors used for research, 
training, and radioisotope production; fuel-cycle facilities; and nuclear and 
radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, and academic settings. 
Additional assets include power reactors and other nuclear facilities that 
are under construction, and those that are being decommissioned and 
                                                 
110 “2010 Healthcare and Public Health Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 12. 
111 Ibid., 1. 
112 “2010 Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan,” 1, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 29, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ IT%20Sector%20Specific%20Plan%202010.pdf. 
113 “Information Technology Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 29, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/information-technology-sector. 
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dismantled. The sector also includes the transportation, storage, and 
disposal of nuclear materials, and radioactive waste.114 
These rely on physical assets, virtual systems, and networks for continued 
operations.115 The sector primarily shares interdependencies with the Chemical, 
Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Emergency Services, Energy, Healthcare and 
Public Health, Information Technology, Transportation Systems, and Water and 
Wastewater Sectors.116 
C. LIFELINE SECTORS 
A Lifeline Sector is defined as “A sector that provides indispensable services that 
enable the continuous operation of critical business and government functions, and would 
risk human health and safety or national and economic security if compromised or not 
promptly restored.”117 Figure 2 demonstrates the interdependencies between the lifeline 
sectors (in red) and the other critical infrastructure sectors. Lifeline sectors have the 
following commonalities.  
• Provides essential products and services that underpin the continued 
operation of nearly every business sector, community, and government 
agency.  
• Typically delivers products and services that are ubiquitous in normal 
circumstances but can create life-threatening conditions if they are 
unavailable for long or even short periods of time.  
• Encompasses complex physical and cyber networks that are highly 
interconnected within their sector, between sectors, and within and 
between adjacent regions.  
                                                 
114 “2015 Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the NIPP 2013,” 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2, accessed May 21, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/nipp-ssp-nuclear-2015-508.pdf. 
115 Ibid., 9–12.  
116 Ibid., 11–12. 
117 “Strengthening Regional Resilience, Final Report and Recommendations,” National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council, November 21, 2013, 14, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/niac-
regional-resilience-final-report-11-21-13-508.pdf. 
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• Its disruption or destruction can cause failures that cascade across 
dependent infrastructures and regions, producing a multiplier effect of 
impacts.118 
 
Figure 2.  Critical Infrastructure Sectors Interdependencies119 
1. Communications Sector Profile 
The Communications Sector is identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security as “an integral component of the U.S. economy, underlying the operations of all 
businesses, public safety organizations, and government.”120 According to the 2010 
Communications Sector-Specific Plan, “the Nation’s communications infrastructure is a 
complex system of systems that incorporates multiple technologies and services with 
                                                 
118 “Strengthening Regional Resilience, Final Report and Recommendations,” National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council, 14.  
119 Source: “2015 Energy Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 19, accessed 
January 20, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-energy-2015-508.pdf. 
120 “Communications Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 20, 2015, 
www.dhs.gov/communications-sector. 
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diverse ownership.”121 The sector is comprised of “wireline [telegraph or telephone 
line],122 wireless, satellite, cable, and broadcasting capabilities, and includes the transport 
networks that support the Internet and other key information systems.”123 A major 
challenge facing this sector is to convince users of the importance of redundant 
communications methods, especially for the emergency response community.124 
The use of the physical and virtual assets of the Communications Sector underlies 
“virtually every element of modern life.”125 “Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies 
the Communications Sector as critical because it provides an ‘enabling function’ across 
all critical infrastructure sectors.”126 This determination as an “enabling function” 
qualifies the Communications Sector as a lifeline sector. 
The Federal Communications Commission has identified electric power as the 
“dominant dependency for the Communications Sector.”127 This sector depends on the 
Energy Sector for the “power to run cellular towers, central offices, and other critical 
communications facilities.”128 As a contingency, backup generators are used to provide 
power for communications facilities when the primary power source fails. The operation 
of generators is reliant on other products the Energy Sector produces such as gasoline, 
diesel, propane, and natural gas. Maintaining a consistent supply chain of fuels also 
creates a dependency on the Transportation Systems Sector. Additionally, the 
Communications Sector “co-locates much of its networking equipment (routers, fiber-
optic cable, etc.) along existing transportation routes (rail lines, highway tunnels, and 
                                                 
121 “2010 Communications Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-communications-2010-508.pdf. 
122 Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “Wireline,” accessed February 11, 2016, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/wireline. 
123 “2010 Communications Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2.  
124 Ibid., 13.  
125 Ibid., 5.  
126 “Communications Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
127 “Tech Topic 19: Communications Interdependencies,” Federal Communications Commission, 
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, accessed February 4, 2016, https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/
techtopics/techtopics19.html. 
128 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Communications Sector.” 
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bridges).”129 The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is critical to the 
Communications Sector because “the environmental control systems for communications 
facilities rely on freshwater for air conditioning and other environmental services.”130 
Additionally, the treatment of wastewater from chillers or coolers is “essential for most 
large scale communications facilities.”131 
2. Energy Sector Profile 
The “U.S. energy infrastructure fuels the economy of the 21st century. Without a 
stable energy supply, health and welfare are threatened, and the U.S. economy cannot 
function.”132 The Energy Sector is identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 “as 
uniquely critical” because it provides an “enabling function” across all critical 
infrastructure sectors.133 This designation as an “enabling function” qualifies the Energy 
Sector as a lifeline sector. The sector is comprised of primary and secondary energy 
sources.  
Primary energy includes petroleum, natural gas, coal, nuclear energy, and 
renewable energy. Electricity is a secondary energy source that is 
generated using these primary forms of energy. For example, coal is a 
primary energy source that is burned by electric power plants to generate 
electricity, which is a secondary source of energy.134 
In addition to coal, natural gas, nuclear sources, and renewable energy resources 
(hydro, wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar power) are also used in the generation of 
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electricity.135 Electric power is pervasive in the United States and is used for lighting, 
heating, cooling, refrigeration, and to power appliances, computers, machinery, medical 
devices and public transportation systems. The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
reports that  
the largest single use of electricity in the U.S. residential sector on an 
annual basis is for air conditioning (cooling), followed by space heating, 
lighting, water heating, refrigeration, and televisions and related electronic 
equipment. About 40 percent of annual electricity use is by clothes 
washers and dryers, computers and related equipment, dishwashers, and 
small appliances and electrical equipment.136 
Meanwhile, in the commercial sector:  
Lighting is the largest use of electricity in the U.S. commercial sector, 
which includes retail, office, education, institutional, public, and 
government buildings, and outdoor and public street lighting. The other 
major commercial uses of electricity are for ventilation, cooling, 
refrigeration, powering computers and other office equipment, and space 
and water heating. There are many other uses of electricity in this sector 
that include powering medical, security, and fire suppression equipment; 
powering elevators and escalators; and running cooking and laundry 
equipment.137 
Crude oil is processed to produce petroleum products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, 
heating oil, jet fuel, lubricating oils, and asphalt.138 In 2014, an average of 13,452 gallons 
of petroleum products were consumed per day by the transportation industry.139 Natural 
gas is used in the production of a myriad of products including steel, glass, paper, 
clothing, paints, fertilizer, plastics, antifreeze, medicines, and explosives. It is also used 
by 50 percent of American homes for heating, cooking, and clothes dryers. The top 
                                                 
135 Information compiled with data obtained from “What Is the Role of Coal in the United States?,” 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed February 12, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/
article/role_coal_us.cfm. 
136 “Electricity Explained: Use of Electricity,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed 
February 12, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_use. 
137 “Electricity Explained: Use of Electricity,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
138 “How Much Gasoline Does the United States Consume?,” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, accessed February 12, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=23&t=10. 
139 Information compiled with data obtained from “Table 3.7c Petroleum Consumption: 
Transportation and Electric Power Sectors,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed February 
12, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec3_21.pdf. 
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consumers of natural gas, in order of usage for 2014 are: 1) electric power generation; 2) 
industrial use; 3) residential consumers; 4) commercial enterprises; and 5) oil and natural 
gas industry.140 
The Energy Sector is “reliant on commercial communications facilities for 
transferring information.”141 It relies heavily on the Transportation Systems Sector to 
maintain an adequate supply of source materials for electric power generation.142 It also 
depends on pipeline systems “to distribute products across the Nation.”143 The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis also 
reports that “82 percent of electric generation plants surveyed are dependent upon water.”144 
3. Transportation Systems Sector Profile 
The Transportation Systems Sector is comprised of “diverse and interconnected 
networks of fixed and mobile assets that provide essential services for the Nation’s livelihood 
and economic prosperity.”145 These systems “transport people, food, water, medicines, 
fuel, and other commodities vital to the public health, safety, security, and economic 
well-being of our Nation.”146 The continuation of services for this sector relies on 
“physical, human, and cyber components.”147 The Transportation Systems Sector is 
                                                 
140 “Natural Gas Explained: Use of Natural Gas,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed 
February 12, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_use. 
141 “Communications Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
142 “Energy Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
143 Ibid. 
144 “Sector Resilience Report: Water and Wastewater Systems,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, July 22, 2014, 2, https://www.massport.com/media/
266269/Report_Sector-Resilience-Report-Water-and-Wastewater.pdf. 
145 “2015 Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1, 
accessed May 22, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-transportation-
systems-2015-508.pdf. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid. 
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identified as being critical to all of the other critical infrastructure sectors.148 This 
criticality is the underlying factor for its designation as a lifeline sector.149 
There are seven subsectors of transportation modes included in this sector. 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
(1) The aviation subsector includes not only aircraft but also air traffic control 
systems, airports, heliports, and landing strips. 
(2) The highway infrastructure and motor carrier subsector includes 
approximately 4 million miles of roadways, 600,000 bridges, and 350 
tunnels. 
(3) The maritime transportation system is comprised of 95,000 miles of 
coastline, 25,000 miles of waterways, 361 ports, and “intermodal landside 
connections, which allow the various modes of transportation to move 
people and goods to, from, and on the water.”150 
(4) The mass transit and passenger rail is comprised of buses, subways, 
trolleys, streetcars, cable cars, and long-distance rail such as Amtrak. 
(5) The pipeline systems carry approximately 65 percent of hazardous liquids; 
chemicals; and nearly all of the natural gas in the United States. The 
pipeline system traverses more than 2.5 million miles across the Nation. 
(6) The freight rail consists of more than 138,000 miles of active railroad, 1.3 
million freight cars, and approximately 20,000 locomotives. Additionally, 
30,000 miles of track are designated “as critical to mobilization and 
resupply of U.S. forces.”151 
(7) The postal and shipping subsector handles 720 million letters and 
packages each day.152 
The Transportation Systems Sector is reliant on the Energy Sector’s fuel products 
to operate varying modes of transportation; power for heating, cooling, and lighting of its 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 2.  
149 “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 17.  





facilities; and for the uninterrupted service of digital transportation network systems. The 
Communications Sector is also critical for the operations of these network systems.153 
The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector provides resources for “cleaning of 
equipment and de-icing airplanes (aviation); water for cooling of equipment (mass transit, 
highway, and freight rail); and common rights of way (pipeline).”154 
4. Water and Wastewater Systems Profile 
The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is comprised of “approximately 
153,000 public drinking water systems and more than 16,000 publicly owned wastewater 
treatment systems.”155 These systems provide drinking water to 84 percent of the 
nation’s population, and 75 percent of the population’s sewage is treated by these 
wastewater systems.156 The sector’s infrastructure includes physical facilities, 
information technology, and communications. This sector is critical to the security of the 
nation because:  
Safe drinking water is a prerequisite for protecting public health and all 
human activity, and properly treated wastewater is vital for preventing 
disease and protecting the environment. Ensuring continuity of drinking 
water and wastewater treatment and service is essential to modern life and 
the Nation’s economy.157 
The essential services provided by the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector are 
the underlying factors for its designation as a lifeline sector.158 In a study conducted by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, it was reported that 75 percent of the critical 
                                                 
153 “2010 Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 16.  
154 James K. Sullivan, Water Sector Interdependencies Summary Report 2011. (Alexandria, VA: 
Water Environment Federation, 2011), 15, accessed February 12, 2016, http://www.wef.org/uploadedFiles/
Access_Water_Knowledge/Water_Security_and_Emergency_Response/Final_WEF_Summary_WSI.pdf. 
155 “Water and Wastewater Systems Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 
22, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/water-and-wastewater-systems-sector. 
156 Ibid. 
157 “2015 Water and Wastewater Systems Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 1, accessed May 22, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-water-2010.pdf. 
158 “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 17. 
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infrastructure sectors receiving assessments between 2011 and 2014 depended on water 
and 68 percent depended on wastewater treatment services for continued operations.159 
This sector also provides the primary resource for the generation of hydroelectric 
and thermoelectric power. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Cyber 
and Infrastructure Analysis reports that 60 percent of Oregon’s and Washington’s energy 
comes from hydroelectric generation. Thermoelectric generation accounts for 64 percent 
of the electricity produced in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, south and central 
California; and for 71.2 percent in Montana, Utah, Idaho, Colorado, and Wyoming.160  
The Water and Wastewater Sector is dependent on the Transportation Systems 
Sector for deliveries of chemicals for the treatment of drinking water and wastewater 
products.161 The Sector relies on the Energy Sector for power to run its facilities and on 
the Communications Sector for the operation of cyber-physical systems such as smart 
water meters. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This review of the critical infrastructure sectors identifies their functions; 
confirms their importance to the security of the Nation; and identifies critical 
interdependencies. Four of these—Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, 
and Water and Wastewater Systems—are also identified by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security as lifeline sectors.162 These lifeline sectors were chosen as subjects 
for risk assessments to determine whether or not slow-onset disasters pose a threat to 
their security and ultimately that of the Nation. My decision was based on the identified 
interdependency between these sectors; the dire consequences a failure of one or more 
                                                 
159 “Sector Resilience Report: Water and Wastewater Systems,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, 1.  
160 Molly Hellmuth et al., Assessment of Climate Change Risks to Energy Reliability in the WECC 
Region (Washington, DC: ICF International, 2014), 2, https://www.wecc.biz/Reliability/Assessment-of-
Climate-Change-Risks-to-Reliability-ICF-Dec-2014.pdf. 
161 “2015 Water and Wastewater Systems Sector-Specific Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 35. 
162 “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 17.  
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pose to all other sectors; and their established importance to national security. The results 
of these assessments are presented in the following chapter. 
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IV. RISK ASSESSMENT: SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS AND THE 
LIFELINE SECTORS 




Risk assessments are performed to identify hazards, ascertain vulnerabilities, 
analyze impacts, and develop strategies for reducing the extent of damages that may be 
caused by these hazards. The subject of risk assessments generally includes hazards that 
are of a natural, technological, or health-based origin. However, the principles can be 
applied to any event that poses a threat to the physical, social, economic, or 
environmental stability of a community, network, or system.163 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The risk assessments in this chapter are based on the process identified in  
Figure 3. For the purpose of these assessments, ocean acidification, melting Arctic ice, 
sea-level rise and drought are pre-identified as the hazards and each of the four lifeline 
sectors are considered the assets at risk. These assessments identify the level of risk each 
hazard poses to the lifeline sectors based on probability and impact (magnitude, 
geographic extent, and losses). Mitigation actions are not addressed in the assessments. 
Results are displayed using a standardized Risk Assessment Matrix.  
                                                 




Figure 3.  Risk Assessment Diagram164 
C. RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX 
The risk assessment matrices in Table 3 through Table 7 use the formula:  
Risk = Probability x Impact. 
The values for probability and impact used in Table 3 through Table 7 are taken 
from the Emergency Management Institute’s IS-230.a Fundamentals of Emergency 
Management: 
Probability: 
• Highly likely—near 100 percent probability in the next year. 
• Likely—between 10 percent and 100 percent probability in the next year, 
or at least one chance in the next 10 years. 
• Possible—between 1 percent and 10 percent probability in the next year, 
or at least one chance in the next 10 years. 
• Unlikely—less than 1 percent probability in the next 100 years. 
                                                 
164 Source: “Risk Assessment,” www.ready.gov.  
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Impact: 
• Catastrophic—multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month 
or more; more than 50 % of property severely damaged. 
• Critical—injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability, shutdown of 
critical facilities for at least 2 weeks, 25% to 50% of property severely 
damaged. 
• Limited—temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1–2 weeks; 
10% to 25% of property severely damaged. 
• Negligible—injuries treatable with first aid; shutdown of critical facilities 
for 24 hours or less; less than 10% of property severely damaged.165 
Table 3.   Risk Assessment Matrix Template166 
 
 
                                                 
165 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, IS-230a, 
Introduction to Hazard Mitigation. (Emmitsburg, MD: Emergency Management Institute. 2010), 5.6.  
166 Adapted from the values for probability and impact presented in the Emergency 







3 =  Likely - between 10% and 100% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years
2 = Possible - between 1% and 10% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years






 Limited – temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1-2 weeks; 10% to 25% of property severely 
damaged
Negligible – injuries treatable with first aid; shutdown of critical facilities for 24 hours or less; less than 10% of 
property severely damaged
Probability :
Highly Likely - near 100% probability in the next year
Catastrophic - multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month or more; more than 50% of 
property severely damaged
Critical - injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability; shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks; 








D. RISK ASSESSMENT: OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
Ocean acidification impacts the people that rely on the seafood industry for their 
livelihood, sustenance, and, in some cases, traditional way of life. While this slow-onset 
disaster poses a threat to the economy and the Food and Agriculture Sector ($86.5 billion 
fishing industry); the environment (coral reefs, protected species, fish, and shellfish); 
social stability (native Alaskan populations’ subsistence fishing); no evidence of direct 
threats were apparent to any the four lifeline sectors. 
Research substantiates ocean acidification is found in varying degrees in the 
coastal waters along the U.S. seaboard. Therefore, this hazard is assigned a probability 
value of (4) Highly Likely. Since my research did not reveal any evidence that ocean 
acidification poses a direct threat to the lifeline sectors, it is assigned the value of (1) 
Negligible impact for each of these sectors. Based on these values, ocean acidification is 
found to pose a low risk to the Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems, and 
Water and Wastewater Systems sectors. These findings are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Ocean Acidification—Risk Assessment Matrix167 
 
 
E. RISK ASSESSMENT: MELTING ARCTIC ICE 
Melting Artic ice contributes to the loss of permafrost resulting in land 
subsidence.168 This causes damages to permanent infrastructures such as buildings, 
pipelines, rail tracks, airstrips, and roads.169 It creates hardships for the vulnerable 
population (100,000 people)170 and, in some cases, threatens forced relocation of entire 
communities (31 communities).171 Melting sea ice threatens the environment (protected 
                                                 
167 Adapted from the Emergency Management Institute’s IS-230.a Fundamentals of Emergency 
Management. 
168 Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “subsidence”: “the gradual caving in or sinking of an area of land,” 
accessed February 14, 2016, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/
subsidence. 
169 National Research Council of the National Academies, Potential Impacts of Climate Change on 
U.S. Transportation, Committee on Climate Change and U.S. Transportation, Transportation Research 
Board, Division of Earth and Life Sciences. (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board), 192, 
accessed February 14, 2016, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr290.pdf. 
170 “Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation,” United States Environmental Protection Agency. 
171 Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities, 9–18. 
SECTOR Probability Impact
Communications LOW 4 4 1
Energy LOW 4 4 1
Transportation LOW 4 4 1
Water & Wastewater LOW 4 4 1
4 =
3 =  Likely - between 10% and 100% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years
2 = Possible - between 1% and 10% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years











Catastrophic - multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month or more; more than 50% of 
property severely damaged
Critical - injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability; shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks; 
25% to 50% of property severely damage
 Limited – temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1-2 weeks; 10% to 25% of property severely 
damaged




Highly Likely - near 100% probability in the next year
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species, seals, walruses, plankton, and plants)172 and the cultural stability of the Native 
Alaskan population (subsistence hunting and traditional way of life).173 Studies have 
shown the melting ice fields contributes to changes in the North American jet stream 
(extreme snowfall, more intense hurricanes, heat waves and drought)174 and has 
increased sea-level rise (40 percent in 35 years).175  
The ice roads in Alaska are lifelines for the northern communities and the mining, 
oil and gas industries and can only be traversed when frozen. Melting permafrost and the 
resulting land subsidence has shortened the timeframe when these roads can be traveled 
while increasing maintenance costs for the transportation industry (extra $10 million per 
year).176 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System has 800 miles of elevated pipeline that 
traverses permafrost areas and transports “approximately 15 percent of the Nation’s 
domestic oil production.”177  
More than 80 percent of Alaska’s economy comes from energy production.178 
Impassable ice roads lead to shorter seasons for “land-based energy exploration.”179 
However, melting ice fields have also created new opportunities for the region. The 
Arctic Ocean is now more accessible for marine vessels to transport energy resources and 
                                                 
172 “Alaska: Climate Impacts in Alaska,” United States Environmental Protection Agency, accessed 
February 14, 2016, https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/alaska.html. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Jeffrey P. Donnelly et al., “Climate Forcing of Unprecedented Intense Hurricane Activity in the 
Last 2000 Years,” 49–65. 
175 Jerry M. Melillo, Highlights of Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National 
Climate Assessment, 60. 
176 Henry G. Schwartz et al., “Transportation,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The 
Third National Climate Assessment, eds. Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T. C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, 
eds. (Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014), 132, 
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177 “Trans-Alaska Pipeline: North Slope to the Northernmost Ice-Free Port,” Explore Fairbanks 
Alaska, accessed February 14, 2016, http://www.explorefairbanks.com/go/energy/trans-alaska-pipeline/27. 
178 F. Stewart Chapin III et al., “Alaska,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third 
National Climate Assessment, eds. Jerry M. Melillo, Terese (T. C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe 




new areas have been uncovered where it is possible to extract “substantial deposits of oil 
and natural gas under the seafloor.”180  
Research substantiates the fact that the Arctic ice fields are melting. Therefore, 
this hazard is assigned a probability value of (4) Highly Likely. While melting Arctic ice 
is found to pose a significant threat to the Transportation Systems and Energy Sectors in 
the Arctic region, this finding is somewhat offset by the discovery of newly accessible oil 
and natural gas fields and improved accessibility for transportation by marine vessels. 
Additionally, the risk to the nation’s Energy Sector is found to be minimal as this region 
produces only 15 percent of the domestic oil production. Therefore, this hazard is 
assigned the value of (2) Limited impact to the Energy Sector. Since no evidence was 
apparent of any direct threat posed by melting Arctic ice to the nation’s Communications, 
Transportation Systems, or Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors, this hazard is 
assigned a value of (1) Negligible impact for each of these lifeline sectors. Based on these 
values, melting Arctic ice is found to pose a medium risk to the Energy Sector and a low 
risk to the Communications, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems 
Sectors. These findings are summarized in Table 5. 
                                                 
180 F. Stewart Chapin III et al., “Alaska,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third 
National Climate Assessment, 518. 
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Table 5.   Melting Arctic Ice—Risk Assessment Matrix181 
 
 
F. RISK ASSESSMENT: SEA-LEVEL RISE 
1. Communications Sector 
Identifying the vulnerability of the Communications Sector to sea-level rise is 
complicated by the complexity of the sector’s use of physical and virtual assets, and 
extreme reliance on the Energy Sector. In one case:  
The resilience of the assets, programs, technology, and systems that 
compose the communications infrastructure reduce the likelihood of a 
significant national-level network failure. For example, the sector achieves 
resilience through the technology and redundancy employed in designing 
networks and by encouraging customers to employ diverse primary and 
backup communications capabilities.182  
                                                 
181 Adapted from the Emergency Management Institute’s IS-230.a Fundamentals of Emergency 
Management. 
182 “2010 Communications Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 222.  
SECTOR Probability Impact
Communications LOW 4 4 1
Energy MEDIUM 8 4 2
Transportation LOW 4 4 1
Water & Wastewater LOW 4 4 1
4 =
3 =  Likely - between 10% and 100% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years
2 = Possible - between 1% and 10% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years







Highly Likely - near 100% probability in the next year
Catastrophic - multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month or more; more than 50% of 
property severely damaged
Critical - injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability; shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks; 








 Limited – temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1-2 weeks; 10% to 25% of property severely 
damaged
Negligible – injuries treatable with first aid; shutdown of critical facilities for 24 hours or less; less than 10% of 
property severely damaged
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Conversely, the 2010 Communications Sector-Specific Plan reports a national 
communication security risk assessment found:  
The communications network does not have to be nationally degraded or 
disrupted to cause national impacts. For example, a limited local outage 
could result in national impacts if a key government or commercial user, 
who is extremely dependent on the communications network, is affected 
and the nature of the effects lead to significant impacts.183 
During Hurricane Sandy, the primary causes for loss of or reduced 
communications capabilities was flooding of major telephone hubs caused by storm 
surge.184 Higher sea levels contribute to more destructive storm surge and in the case of 
Hurricane Sandy, an eight-inch rise in sea level along the impacted coastline contributed 
to a nine-foot storm surge that “exposed an additional 75,000 people and $8.9 billion in 
property in New York City.”185 This was exacerbated by power outages when power 
substations were also inundated by storm surge.186 Despite having back-up generators, 
some critical communications facilities could not function because the generators were 
flooded, or fuel was unavailable due to a disruption in the fuel transportation system.187  
2. Energy Sector  
Many of the facilities critical to the Energy Sector are located in areas that are 
threatened by sea-level rise because “power plants, oil and gas refineries, storage tanks 
transformers, and electricity transmission lines are often located directly on coastal 
                                                 
183 “2010 Communications Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 231.  
184 Linda I. Gibbs and Caswell F. Holloway. “Hurricane Sandy After Action: Report and 
Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg,” May 2013, 24, http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/
downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf. 
185 “Storm Surge and Sea Level Rise: Advancing Waters,” Climate Central, accessed February 19, 
2016, http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/storm-surge-and-sea-level-rise-advancing-waters. 
186 Gibbs and Holloway, “Hurricane Sandy After Action: Report and Recommendations to Mayor 
Michael R. Bloomberg,” 14.  
187 Alex Kwasinski, “Hurricane Sandy Effects on Communications Systems (Preliminary Report)” 
(University of Texas at Austin PR-AK-0112-2012), December 4, 2012, 
http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~kwasinski/preliminary%20telecom%20report%20v3%20comp.pdf. 
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floodplain.”188 Figure 4 identifies energy facilities that are located less than four feet 
above the tide line.  
 
Figure 4.  Low-Lying Coastal Energy Facilities Map189 
The United States Department of Energy reports that by 2030, Alabama, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas will have “nearly $1 trillion in energy assets at 
potential risk from rising sea levels and more intense hurricanes.”190 The Gulf Coast is 
home to “nearly 4,000 active oil and gas platforms, more than 30 refineries, and 25,000 
miles of pipeline, the Gulf region’s oil and gas industry produces approximately 50 
                                                 
188 Jerry M. Melillo, Highlights of Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National 
Climate Assessment, 89.  
189 Source: “Sea Level Rise Threats to Energy Sector,” Climate Central, http://slr.s3.amazonaws.com/
SLR-Threats-to-Energy-Infrastructure.pdf. 
190 “U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather,” U.S. Department 
of Energy, July 2013, 39, accessed November 18, 2015, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/
20130716-Energy%20Sector %20Vulnerabilities%20Report.pdf. 
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percent of U.S. crude oil and natural gas and contains nearly half of the total U.S. refining 
capacity.”191 Major products that pass through coastal ports are also impacted, as 
“roughly two-thirds of all U.S. oil imports are transported through this region, and 
pipelines traversing the region transport over 90 percent of domestic Outer Continental 
Shelf oil and gas.”192 Also, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), “the world’s 
largest supply of emergency crude oil…is stored in large underground salt caverns along 
the Gulf Coast. Approximately 700 million barrels of crude oil are stored in the SPR’s 
four storage sites, providing an available supply of crude oil in the event of an 
emergency.”193 
Energy Sector facilities are also threatened along the California Coast. In 2012, 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory published the results of a study on the 
California energy infrastructure and the risks posed by climate change. Among other 
threats, the study found that “up to 25 current coastal power plants and 86 substations are 
at risk of flooding or compromised operation due to sea level rise.”194 Forty-nine of the 
identified substations are located in the Bay Area. Figure 5 identifies the 25 coastal 
power plants. 
                                                 
191 “U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather,” 30.  
192 Virginia R. Burkett et al., “Why Study the Gulf Coasts?,” in Impacts of Climate Change and 
Variability on Transportation Systems and Infrastructure: Gulf Coast Study, Phase I, eds. Michael J. 
Savonis, Virginia R. Burkett, and Joanne R. Potter (Washington, DC: Department of Transportation, 2008), 
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Change” (California Energy Commission Publication Number: CEC‐500‐2012‐057) (Berkeley, CA: 




Figure 5.  Power Plants Threatened by Sea-Level Rise—Pacific Coast195 
                                                 
195 Source: Jan Dell et al., “Energy Supply and Use” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: 
The Third National Climate Assessment, eds. J. M. Melillo, Terese (T. C.) Richmond, and G. W. Yohe 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014), 119, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/ 
report/sectors/energy. 
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According to Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National 
Climate Assessment: 
Rising sea levels will combine with storm surges and high tides to threaten 
power-generating facilities located in California coastal communities and 
around the San Francisco Bay. Sea level rise and more intense heavy 
precipitation events increase the risk of coastal flooding and damages to 
infrastructure.196 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency reports that sea-level rise in 
the Northeast “has risen by approximately 1 foot since 1900, which has caused more 
frequent flooding of coastal areas.”197 By the end of this century, it is anticipated this 
level could increase four feet and is “likely to disrupt and damage important 
infrastructure, including communication systems, energy production, transportation, 
waste management, and access to clean water.”198 Figure 6 illustrates a four-foot rise in 
sea level along the Atlantic seaboard. 
                                                 
196 Jan Dell et al., “Energy Supply and Use” in Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The 
Third National Climate Assessment, 117.  
197 “Climate Change and the U.S. Energy Sector: Regional Vulnerabilities and Resilience Solutions,” 






Figure 6.  Sea-Level Rise Projection—Atlantic Coast199 
                                                 
199 Source: E. Robert Thieler and Erika S. Hammar-Klose. “National Assessment of Coastal 
Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise: Preliminary Results for the U.S. Atlantic Coast,” U.S. Geological Survey 
Woods Hole, Massachusetts, 2000, http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds68/reports/gulfrep.pdf. 
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3. Transportation Systems Sector 
The Transportation Systems Sector is critical to the economic stability of the 
United States as it moves essential products and services such as energy, food, 
manufacturing, and trade goods.200 Included in this system are ports, airports, rail 
terminals, roads, bridges, locks, canals, light rail, subways, freight and commuter 
railways; and pipelines.201 The Committee on Climate Change and U.S. Transportation 
finds that “the greatest impact of climate change for North America’s transportation 
systems will be flooding of coastal roads, railways, transit systems, and runways because 
of global rising sea levels, coupled with storm surges and exacerbated in some locations 
by land subsidence.”202  
Transportation systems within the Gulf Coast area are critical to the movement of 
domestic and international goods. Agricultural exports and oil imports are two of the 
major products that pass through ports located within this area. “Roughly two-thirds of all 
U.S. oil imports are transported through this region, and pipelines traversing the region 
transport over 90 percent of domestic Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas.”203 Further, a 
U.S. Department of Transportation study on this area found “that 27 percent of the major 
roads, nine percent of rail lines, and 72 percent of ports are at or below four feet in 
elevation and are at risk to flooding within the first half century and perhaps even 
permanent inundation by the end of the century.204 Figure 7 identities major 
transportation hubs in the Gulf Coast region that are threatened by sea-level rise. 
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Figure 7.  Gulf Coast Transportation Hubs at Risk205 
Coastal ports will also experience significant impacts due to “a combination of 
sea level rise, storm surges, erosion, and land subsidence.”206 This includes “three of the 
most important for imports and exports: Los Angeles/Long Beach (which handles 31 
percent of the U.S. port container movements) and the Port of South Louisiana and the 
Port of Galveston/Houston (which combined handle 25 percent of the tonnage handled by 
U.S. ports).”207 Additionally, “1) as sea level rises, bridge clearance may not be adequate 
to allow safe passage of large vessels; 2) even if the elevation of port facilities is 
adequate, any main access road that is not elevated will become more frequently 
inundated, thus affecting port operations.”208 Also at risk are “thirteen of the nation’s 47 
largest airports.”209 Disruption to air travel and freight shipments will also be intensified 
by the flooding of “access roads and public transportation systems that transport airport 
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workers and passengers to and from the facilities.”210 Figure 8 identifies the 13 major 
airports that are threatened by sea-level rise. 
 
Figure 8.  Airports Vulnerable to Storm Surge211 
4. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
Sea-level rise threatens the freshwater supply of coastal regions by increasing the 
“salinity of both surface water and ground water through salt water intrusion.”212 One 
example of this occurs in the Everglades that recharge the Biscayne aquifer, the “primary 
water supply to the Florida Keys.”213 Rising sea levels can also push saltwater farther 
upstream into freshwater rivers impacting aquifers in low-lying areas such as New 
                                                 
210 Andrew Freedman, “U.S. Airports Face Increasing Threat from Rising Seas,” Climate Central, 
June 18, 2013, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/coastal-us-airports-face-increasing-threat-from-sea-
level-rise-16126. 
211 Source: Henry G. Schwartz et al., “Transportation,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United 
States: The Third National Climate Assessment, 134.  
212 “Climate Impacts on Water Resources,” United States Environmental Protection Agency, accessed 
February 13, 2016, https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/water.html. 
213 Ibid. 
 62 
Jersey.214 Groundwater aquifers are also threatened along the Pacific coastline and 
“seawater intrusion is already problematic in California’s coastal aquifers throughout 
Central and Southern California, including the Pajaro and Salinas Valleys and aquifers in 
Orange and Los Angeles Counties.”215  
Wastewater treatment plants are also threatened in coastal communities because 
they are “typically located at low elevations to take advantage of gravity-fed sewage 
collection.”216 Coastal flooding also puts these plants at risk from saltwater intrusion that 
will “damage pumps and other equipment, and lead to untreated sewage discharges.”217 
During Hurricane Sandy, “more than 10 billion gallons of sewage spilled into waterways 
and neighborhoods.218 Figure 9 identifies wastewater treatment plants located along the 
California coastline. 
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Figure 9.  Wastewater Treatment Plants—California Coast219 
5. Risk Assessment Matrix—Sea Level Rise 
Varying degrees of sea-level rise is well documented along the Atlantic, Gulf, and 
Pacific Coasts of the United States. Research also substantiates that sea-level rise 
exacerbates coastal flooding and storm surge during severe storms such as hurricanes. 
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According to a report published by the Environmental Protection Agency, “since 1878 
about six to seven hurricanes have formed in the North Atlantic every year. Roughly two 
per year make landfall in the United States.”220 Based on these findings sea level rise is 
assigned a probability value of (4) Highly Likely for each of the lifeline sectors.  
The events of Hurricane Sandy are an example of a localized degradation or 
disruption in communications that did not result in a national impact. Therefore, it could 
be extrapolated that sea-level rise poses a negligible risk to the nation’s Communications 
Sector. However, given the national impacts a localized or limited loss of 
communications could have “if a key government or commercial user…is affected and 
the nature of the effects lead to significant impacts,”221 sea-level rise is assigned a value 
of (2) Limited impact. Based on the factors of a Highly Likely probability and Limited 
impact, sea-level rise is determined to pose a medium risk to the Communications Sector.  
Hurricane Sandy serves as an example of the threat to the Energy Sector that 
exists along the Atlantic Coast. In this case, eight inches of sea-level rise contributed to a 
nine-foot storm surge impacting thousands of people and billions of dollars in 
property.222 According to a report published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration “power outages from the combined effects of wind and surge left some 
coastal communities in New Jersey without power for months.”223 Based on the 
cumulative number of energy infrastructure exposed to sea level rise; the extent of their 
importance to the U.S. Energy Sector; and the length of time they may be shut down, the 
impact of sea-level rise to the Energy Sector is assigned a value of (4) Catastrophic 
impact. Based on the factors of a Highly Likely probability and Catastrophic impact, sea-
level rise is determined to pose a very high risk to the Energy Sector.  
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Storm surge during Hurricane Sandy is credited with “some of the most 
devastating impacts, including flooding in New York City’s subway tunnels, water 
overtopping runways at La Guardia and Kennedy airports, and damage to the New Jersey 
Transit System estimated at approximately $400 million.”224 Impacts to the 
Transportation Systems Sector left commuters in New York without reliable public 
transportation for four days. The use of personal vehicles was severely limited during this 
same period because 38 percent of gas stations in the Metropolitan New York had no 
gasoline for sale.225 Based on the length of time transportation systems were shut down 
during Hurricane Sandy and the number of critical transportation hubs that are exposed to 
sea-level rise, this hazard is assigned a value of (2) Limited impact. Based on the factors 
of a Highly Likely probability and Limited impact, sea-level rise is determined to pose a 
medium risk to the Transportation Systems Sector. 
Saltwater intrusion into freshwater supply is documented along the nation’s 
coastlines. This intrusion not only threatens groundwater aquifers but also damages 
pumps and other components that are used in water- and wastewater-treatment plants. 
Sea-level rise also contributed to untreated sewage from surge-damaged wastewater 
treatment plants to flow into waterways in New Jersey and New York for up to a month 
after Hurricane Sandy.226 Based on the number of water and wastewater treatment plants 
that are exposed to sea-level rise and the length of time plants were shut down because of 
the storm-surge from Hurricane Sandy, this hazard is assigned a value of (3) Critical 
impact. Based on the factors of Highly Likely probability and Critical impact, sea-level 
rise is determined to pose a high risk to the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector. The 
findings of the sea-level rise risk assessment are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   Sea Level Rise—Risk Assessment Matrix227 
 
 
G. RISK ASSESSMENT: DROUGHT 
1. Energy Sector  
The United States Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Cyber and 
Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) identifies the Energy Sector as one that is most 
vulnerable to drought.228 According to a report published by the OCIA, “all sources of 
energy (including electricity) require water in their production processes including 
extracting raw materials, cooling in thermal processes, cleaning processes, cultivating 
crops for biofuels, and powering turbines.”229 The report also states “severe drought 
could curtail power production in the Pacific Northwest, which is strongly dependent on 
                                                 
227 Adapted from the Emergency Management Institute’s IS-230.a Fundamentals of Emergency 
Management. 
228 “Drought Impacts to Critical Infrastructure,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, April 23, 2015, 1, http://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/
USDHSFACIR/2015/04/30/file_attachments/386534/
Drought%2BImpacts%2Bto%2BCritical%2BInfrastructure.pdf. 
229 Ibid., 8.  
SECTOR Probability Impact
Communications MEDIUM 8 4 2
Energy VERY HIGH 16 4 4
Transportation MEDIUM 8 4 2
Water & Wastewater HIGH 12 4 3
4 =
3 =  Likely - between 10% and 100% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years
2 = Possible - between 1% and 10% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years






Catastrophic - multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month or more; more than 50% of 
property severely damaged
Critical - injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability; shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks; 








 Limited – temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1-2 weeks; 10% to 25% of property severely 
damaged
Probability :
Highly Likely - near 100% probability in the next year
Negligible – injuries treatable with first aid; shutdown of critical facilities for 24 hours or less; less than 10% of 
property severely damaged
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hydroelectric power, by up to 22 percent. Under the same drought conditions, the Texas 
Gulf Coast Basin would lose 25 percent of its production, due to its dependence on water 
for cooling its fossil-fuel plants.”230  
Recent events have heightened the awareness of this dependency and 
demonstrated that the limited availability of water due to drought greatly impacts the 
resiliency of the Energy Sector.231 A report published in December 2014 identifies these 
impacts as reduction in oil and gas production, delays in the delivery of crude oil, 
petroleum products and coal due to low or high river flows; and a decrease in the 
production of bioenergy fuel because of limited water for irrigation.232  
2. Communications Sector 
According to the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, “Communications 
equipment and information technology data centers use water for cooling. Data centers, 
for example, often use high-tonnage heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems 
that require drinkable water to operate in order to keep their computer systems cool.”233 
Also “submarine telecom cables” that are installed in rivers and lakes are susceptible to 
damage if water levels fall.234 Additionally, drought conditions in parts of the country 
have increased the risk of wildfires. For instance, in the Southwest wildfires are “more 
likely and dangerous, damaging electric transmission and distribution systems as well as 
wooden electrical and communication poles and aerial equipment, including fiber optic 
and copper lines, microwave towers, and equipment in vaults.”235 
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3. Transportation Systems Sector 
Drought is most closely identified with the risk it poses to the Food and 
Agriculture and Energy Sectors. However, “[persistent] drought conditions have the 
potential to limit port and waterway transportation operations by reducing routes 
available and limiting cargo carrying capacity, resulting in increased transportation 
cost.”236 For instance, the closure of the barge industry on the Mississippi River in 1988 
(when water levels fell) cost “the U.S. barge industry an estimated $1 billion.”237  
The high temperatures that often accompany drought conditions can cause land 
subsidence resulting in damaged roadways, runways, rail line buckling and expansion of 
bridge joints.238 While it is reported that pipelines are not likely to be impacted by the 
extreme heat, land subsidence cannot be ruled out as a threat.  
4. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis also identifies the Water and 
Wastewater Systems Sector as one at that is most vulnerable to drought.239 According to 
the report:  
Nationally, groundwater from aquifers supplies about 33 percent of the 
public water supply and provides drinking water for more than 97 percent 
of the rural population. If groundwater is depleted more quickly than it is 
replenished, which may happen during a drought, aquifer levels can drop, 
making water unavailable for irrigation and consumption.240  
The Southeast, Great Plains, and Southwest regions of the United States primarily 
use groundwater as the main water source. These areas have also been impacted by 
drought in recent years and are projected to have increasing water demands as drought 
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conditions continue to fluctuate and temperatures rise.241 This increase in water demand 
and declining water recharge rates threaten “the sustainability of many aquifers.”242 In 
2011, drought conditions and abnormally high temperatures in Texas and Oklahoma are 
credited with “depleting water resources and contributing to more than $10 billion in 
direct losses to agriculture alone.”243  
Drought conditions can also lead to contaminated water sources.244 According to 
the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, “water reservoirs may experience 
increased pollutant levels and lower levels of oxygen, contributing to higher 
concentrations of illness-causing bacteria and protozoa, as well as toxic blue-green algae 
blooms.”245 Drought also contributes to an increase in “the salinity of both surface water 
and ground water through salt water intrusion.”246 This occurs because lower levels in 
aquifers and rivers “can allow saltwater to move inland and also contaminate the water 
supply.”247 This phenomenon also creates difficulties for wastewater treatment facilities 
because many are “not equipped to remove salts, which can cause problems not only for 
potable water but also for industrial uses. In July and August 2012, saline intrusion into 
drinking water was reported in Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana.”248 Wastewater 
treatment systems are also at risk for drought-related land subsidence when “aquifers are 
depleted and unsupported ground collapses.”249 Land subsidence can impact water or 
wastewater pipes and “can result in unfiltered water entering from lakes and streams and, 
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eventually, aquifers used as drinking water sources, sullying the drinking water 
supply.250 
5. Risk Assessment Matrix—Drought 
Droughts of note have plagued the Continental United States during the 20th 
century and fluctuated across the nation between the years of 2000 and 2014. During 
periods of drought, the availability of water is compromised by a shortfall or 
contamination of existing water supplies. Studies have shown that the lifeline sectors 
depend on an interrupted water supply for their continued operations. This is 
substantiated by the findings of the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis that 
identifies drought as a direct threat to each of the lifeline sectors. Based on these findings, 
drought is assigned a probability value of (4) Highly Likely for each of the lifeline 
sectors.  
The intensity of drought conditions fluctuates across the United States and makes 
it difficult to ascertain a consistent level of drought’s impact to the nation’s lifeline 
sectors. However, based on research and the findings of the Office of Cyber and 
Infrastructure Analysis, I have extrapolated a value of (3) Critical impact. This value is 
substantiated by the statement in the Long Term Drought Resilience: Federal Action Plan 
of the National Drought Resilience Partnership that “extreme, widespread drought 
challenges the security of the U.S. food supply and the integrity of critical infrastructure, 
causes extensive economic impacts, and increases energy costs.”251 Based on the factors 
of Highly Likely probability and Critical impact, drought is determined to pose a high 
risk to each of the lifeline sectors. The findings of the drought rise risk assessment are 
summarized in Table 7. 
                                                 
250250 “Drought Impacts to Critical Infrastructure,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, 7. 
251 “Long Term Drought Resilience: Federal Action Plan of the National Drought Resilience 
Partnership,” The White House, March 2016, 1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
drought_resilience_action_plan_2016_final.pdf. 
 71 




This chapter presents the risk assessments performed to ascertain if slow-onset 
disasters pose a threat to the nation’s critical infrastructure lifeline sectors: 
Communications, Energy, Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems 
Sectors. The results show ocean acidification poses a low risk to each of the lifeline 
sectors. Melting Arctic ice poses a medium risk to the Energy Sector but a low risk to the 
Communications, Transportation Systems and Water and Wastewater Systems Sectors. 
Sea-level rise poses a medium risk to the Communications and Transportation Systems 
Sectors; a high risk to the Water and Wastewater Systems; and a very high risk to the 
Energy Sector. Drought is found to pose a high risk to each of the lifeline sectors.  
Having determined the level of risk slow-onset disasters pose to homeland 
security, the next step was to ascertain whether or not they are addressed by the homeland 
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SECTOR Probability Impact
Communications HIGH 12 4 3
Energy HIGH 12 4 3
Transportation HIGH 12 4 3
Water & Wastewater HIGH 12 4 3
4 =
3 =  Likely - between 10% and 100% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years
2 = Possible - between 1% and 10% probability in the next year, or at least one chance in the next 10 years






Highly Likely - near 100% probability in the next year
Catastrophic - multiple deaths; shutdown of critical facilities for 1 month or more; more than 50% of 
property severely damaged
Critical - injuries or illness resulting in permanent disability; shutdown of critical facilities for at least 2 weeks; 
25% to 50% of property severely damage
 Limited – temporary injuries; shutdown of critical facilities for 1-2 weeks; 10% to 25% of property severely 
damaged











security discipline. Chapter V provides an overview and analysis of the nation’s current 




V. RELEVANCE OF THE NATION’S APPROACH TO 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
The great thing in this world is not so much where we are, but in what 
direction we are moving.” 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Drought and sea-level rise are the two slow-onset disasters I identified in Chapter 
IV as posing a high risk to homeland security. I also identified that occurrences of these 
types of disasters also pose a threat to the local communities where they occur and, in 
many cases, have cascading consequences that reach beyond the geographic borders of 
these communities. Having made these determinations, I moved to the final question 
posed in my thesis: Are slow-onset disasters adequately addressed in the homeland 
security discipline? Answering this question requires an understanding of emergency 
management and homeland security policies and the relationship that exists between 
these two disciplines. 
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
Between 1979 and 2001, FEMA utilized the “Integrated Emergency Management 
System, an all-hazards approach based on preparedness, response, recovery, and 
mitigation, which provided direction, control, and warning systems common to the full 
range of emergencies from small, isolated events to the ultimate emergency—war.”253 
This changed when the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of 
Homeland Security. Since that time there has been an ongoing debate on the relationship 
between the homeland security and emergency management disciplines. This debate 
supports the perception of a separation between the two—protecting the nation from 
terrorist acts lies solely within the homeland security domain while threats from natural 
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hazards belong in the field of emergency management. As both of these disciplines are 
unarguably engaged in disaster consequence management, an understanding of their 
relationship is necessary to inform the scope of this chapter.  
Emergency management is defined by William Waugh and Kathleen Tierney as 
“the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities 
reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.”254 The 2010 Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review defines homeland security as “a concerted national effort to 
ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards 
where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”255 Based on these 
definitions, emergency management is a method for achieving the goal of homeland 
security and, therefore, is a critical component within the homeland security discipline. It 
is this perspective that informs the assessment of our nation’s methodology for a 
coordinated approach to homeland security and whether or not it adequately addresses 
slow-onset disasters. 
C. COORDINATED APPROACH TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
The nation’s approach to homeland security includes two major pieces of 
legislation that enables the federal government to provide guidance and assistance to 
states for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities—The 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002. Both of these are strengthened by policy directives that frame 
standardized tactics for the nation “to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient 
against terrorism and other hazards.”256 This includes “efforts to secure the 
infrastructures and assets vital to our national security, governance, public health and 
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safety, economy, and public confidence.”257 Figure 10 illustrates the nation’s coordinated 
approach to homeland security. 
 
Figure 10.  Coordinated Approach to Homeland Security 
D. ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE ACT 
The primary authority for the provision of federal aid to state and local 
jurisdictions for preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities is the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The genesis of 
this act begins with the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 that authorizes the federal 
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government “to provide supplementary Federal assistance when a Governor requested 
help and the President approved the request by declaring a major disaster.”258 Prior to the 
passing of this act, requests for federal disaster relief required Congress to pass a separate 
law for each disaster. Following a number of amendments, the Disaster Relief Act 
eventually progressed to become the act we know today. The Stafford Act authorizes the 
issuance of major disaster or emergency declarations and provides federal assistance 
when state, local, or tribal jurisdiction’s response resources are overwhelmed. This act is 
also the enabling authority for preparedness grants and programs. One concept has 
remained constant regardless of the number of amendments to the Stafford act—federal 
assistance is intended “to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives 
and to protect property and public health and safety.”259 Figure 11 illustrates the 
supplemental assistance that may be provided by the Stafford Act. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Stafford Act: Supplemental Assistance for Preparedness, Mitigation, 
Response and Recovery 
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A major disaster declaration is generally declared as a result of a disaster or 
catastrophic event. As defined in the Stafford Act, a major disaster is 
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of 
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which 
in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity 
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to 
supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local 
governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, 
loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.260  
Emergency declarations are issued prior to an event “to save lives and to protect 
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in 
any part of the United States.”261 Fire Emergency Management Grant declarations are 
issued by either the president or a FEMA regional director to provide assistance for 
“mitigation, management, and control of any fire on public or private forest land or 
grassland that threatens such destruction as would constitute a major disaster.”262  
Three types of federal disaster assistance programs are available if a state receives 
a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act: Public Assistance, Individual 
Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation. The determination of the type of assistance the state 
receives is based on the extent of the damage and the eligibility of those impacted by the 
disaster.  
Stafford Act declarations are based upon damages that occur during a definitive 
period of time known as the incident period. This requirement is not identified in the 
Stafford Act but is defined in 44 CFR §206.32(f): 
The time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs. No 
Federal assistance under the [Stafford] Act shall be approved unless the 
damage or hardship to be alleviated resulted from the disaster-causing 
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incident which took place during the incident period or was in anticipation 
of that incident.263 
Slow-onset disasters take years to fully materialize. Therefore, determining an 
incident period for these events is difficult if not impossible to ascertain. This eliminates 
the eligibility of slow-onset disasters for Stafford Act disaster declarations.  
The Stafford Act also authorizes funding for disaster preparedness, response, and 
pre-disaster mitigation. The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is 
intended to “to provide Federal funds to states to assist state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments in preparing for all hazards.”264 The EMPG program is discussed further in 
Section E.5 of this chapter. The Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant (PDM) program provides 
funding to “assist States, territories, Federally-recognized tribes, and local communities 
in implementing a sustained pre-disaster natural hazard mitigation program.”265 
Mitigation planning, projects and public education for reducing the impacts of future 
disaster are eligible for PDM funding.  
The provisions in the Stafford Act for activities related to preparedness, response, 
and pre-disaster mitigation can be applied to slow-onset disasters. This is substantiated by 
a memo issued by the FEMA Deputy Associate Administrator for Mitigation on 
December 23, 2013. The memo announced “FEMA will fund cost effective hazard 
mitigation projects that include sea level rise estimates.”266 This is supported by language 
in the 2015 Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) guidance that recognizes 
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“Mitigation projects must adapt to new challenges posed by more powerful storms, 
frequent heavy precipitation, heat waves, prolonged droughts, extreme flooding, higher 
sea levels, and other weather events.”267 This language provides the opportunity to use 
mitigation funding to lessen the impact of drought and sea level rise events. This was 
clarified further in December 2015 when FEMA released information on eligible climate 
resilient mitigation activities specifically focused on flood and drought conditions.268 
E. HOMELAND SECURITY ACT  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishes the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and defines the department’s primary mission to: 
A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 
C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that 
do occur within the United States; 
D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including 
by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and 
emergency planning; 
E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the 
Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not 
diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; 
F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not 
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the 
homeland; and 
G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, 
coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to 
efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.269 
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The defining language of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission is 
primarily focused on counter-terrorism. However, it also identifies the department’s role 
as a focal point for both “natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.”270 
Therefore, subsequent enabling guidance and assistance to states for prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response and recovery activities under this act should address both 
manmade and natural threats, including slow-onset disasters. Figure 12 illustrates 
enabling guidance and assistance provided by the Homeland Security Act. 
 
Figure 12.  Homeland Security Act: Addressing Natural and Manmade Threats 
                                                 
270 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-296, §101(b) (2002). 
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1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5): Management 
of Domestic Incidents 
The Department of Homeland Security’s mission is supported by Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5): Management of Domestic Incidents that 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a “consistent nationwide approach 
for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity.”271 This consistent nationwide approach called for in HSPD 5 is achieved 
with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that establishes a standardized 
incident command system, multi-agency coordination, unified command, training, 
resource management, credentialing, and the processing of situational information. This 
directive also establishes a National Response Plan (NRP) to “provide the structure and 
mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for Federal support to 
State and local incident managers.”272 The NRP has since been replaced by the National 
Response Framework. The directives issued under HSPD 5 can be applied to slow-onset 
disasters. 
2. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness and 
Related Initiatives 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness 
is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States 
through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to 
the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, 
pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.273 
The Directive requires the establishment of a National Preparedness Goal, National 
Preparedness System and National Preparedness Report. The Strategic National Risk 
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Assessment and National Planning Frameworks are additional initiatives that support 
National Preparedness. The directives issued under PPD8 can be applied to slow-onset 
disasters. 
a. National Preparedness Goal 
The National Preparedness Goal is to achieve “a secure and resilient nation with 
the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”274 
Thirty-one core capabilities were identified with the release of the goal as the “distinct 
critical elements necessary for our success.”275 These are grouped under the Prevention, 
Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery mission areas.276 Four of the mission 
areas are intended to address all hazards, while prevention addresses the “capabilities 
necessary to avoid, prevent or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism.”277  
b. National Preparedness System 
The National Preparedness System is comprised of six components: 
(1) Identifying and Assessing Risk 
(2) Estimating Capability Requirements 
(3) Building and Sustaining Capabilities 
(4) Planning to Deliver Capabilities 
                                                 








(5) Validating Capabilities 
(6) Reviewing and Updating278 
The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) is used to identify 
risks and assess threats and consequences faced by each community. The Strategic 
National Risk Assessment is used to analyze the greatest risks to the nation. Together 
these create an integrated understanding of the range of threats and hazards that would 
stress the core capabilities of the nation.279 Risks identified in a THIRA can include 
slow-onset disasters. 
c. National Preparedness Report 
The annual National Preparedness Report provides an update on the nation’s 
progress in building, sustaining, and delivering the 31 Core Capabilities identified in the 
National Preparedness Goal. One finding from the 2015 National Preparedness Report is 
relevant to the subject of this thesis as it refers to the 2012 and 2013 national droughts as 
an example of the complex events cited below:  
In recent years, several events that have not resulted in a Stafford Act 
declaration have required extensive Federal interagency coordination in 
support of state and local response efforts. These complex events have 
taken place over extended periods of time and often across large 
geographic areas, with uncertainty surrounding the role of existing 
coordination structures and authorities for multi-agency activity for non-
Stafford Act events.280  
d. Strategic National Risk Assessment 
The Strategic National Risk Assessment was performed to recognize the core 
capabilities for “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through 
systematic preparation for threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, 
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280 “2015 National Preparedness Report,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 12, accessed 
September 10, 2015. http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1432751954859-
fcaf2acc365b5a7213a38bbeb5cd1d61/2015_NPR_508c_20150527_Final.pdf. 
 84 
including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural 
disasters.”281 The assessment identifies national-level events for assessment. These are 
grouped into three categories: 1) natural hazards; 2) technological or accidental hazards; 
and 3) adversarial, human-caused threats or hazards.  
Thresholds of consequences are used to determine whether or not events should 
be considered for assessment. The thresholds include economic consequences and 
fatalities or injuries/illnesses. Events are limited to those having a “distinct beginning and 
end and those with an explicit nexus to homeland security missions.”282 In some cases, 
events are considered if it is believed the psychological impact of an occurrence would 
rise to the level of a national incident. Once identified, risks are assessed based on their 
frequency and consequences relative to six categories of harm: 1) loss of life; 2) injuries 
and illnesses; 3) direct economic costs; 4) social displacement; 5) psychological distress; 
and 6) environment impact.  
Slow-onset disasters are natural disasters that have an explicit nexus to the 
homeland security mission areas of Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery. The 
results of my research in Chapter II also shows slow-onset disasters would qualify for 
assessment as natural hazards that have economic consequences, results in fatalities, and 
causes damages identified in the six categories of harm. However, slow-onset disasters 
and their consequences take years to fully emerge. Consequently, they cannot be 
considered in the Strategic National Risk Assessment due to the limiting factor of not 
having a distinct beginning and end. However, The SNRA does acknowledge drought 
and heat waves among other threats to be considered in preparedness planning: 
Threats and hazards, such as droughts, heat waves, winter storms, rain 
storms, and different types of technological/accidental or human-caused 
hazards, can also pose a risk to jurisdictions across the country and should 
be considered, as appropriate, in preparedness planning.283  
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3. National Planning Frameworks 
The National Planning Frameworks “set the strategy and doctrine for building, 
sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness 
Goal.”284 There are five frameworks. Each concentrates on one of the key mission areas 
of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The National Prevention 
Framework specifically addresses terrorism and provides information on what to do “upon 
the discovery of intelligence or information regarding an imminent threat to the homeland 
in order to thwart an initial or follow-up terrorist act.”285 The remaining frameworks have 
a nexus to both terrorism and natural disasters and can be applied to slow-onset disasters. 
4. Critical Infrastructure Policy Directives, National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan and Sector-Specific Plans  
As discussed in Chapter III, the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure is 
of great importance to our national security. Federal strategies and policies to guide 
protection efforts began with the formation of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in 1996. The Commission’s findings and recommendations led 
to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(PDD 63) that “set as a national goal the ability to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure from intentional attacks (both physical and cyber) by the year 2003.”286 
Since that time, a number of directives and strategies were issued to further this goal. 
Most notably are the National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7): Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection, December 2003 and Presidential Policy Directive 21: 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 2013. Cumulatively, these 
policies establish the framework for addressing critical infrastructure protection: 
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identification of critical infrastructure sectors; ensuring physical and cyber security; 
public-private partnerships; national infrastructure protection plan and “sector-specific 
plans to establish goals and priorities for the sector that address their current risk 
environment.”287 Climate change is specifically identified within the risk environment to 
be addressed.288 
5. Federal Preparedness (Non-disaster) Grants 
The Department of Homeland Security provides preparedness non-disaster grants 
to “improve the nation’s readiness in preventing, protecting against, responding to, 
recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies.”289 These programs are authorized by varying legislation but funding for all 
are appropriated through the annual Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act.  
The Emergency Management Performance Grant program (EMPG) is authorized 
under the Stafford Act. It is intended to “obtain the resources required to support the 
National Preparedness Goal’s (the Goal’s) associated mission areas and core 
capabilities.”290 Funding under this grant may be used for personnel, planning, training, 
equipment, and facilities to address all hazards. 
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) is comprised of the State 
Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and 
Operation Stonegarden (OPSG). Together these are intended “to support state and local 
efforts to prevent terrorism and other catastrophic events and to prepare the nation for the 
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threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States.”291 
However, eligibility is further limited in the specific grant guidance for each component. 
For SHSP, funding is allowable for “preparedness activities that address high-priority 
preparedness gaps across all core capabilities where a nexus to terrorism exists.”292 The 
UASI grant is limited to “efforts to build, sustain, and deliver the capabilities necessary to 
prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.”293 Finally, 
OPSG funding is intended to “to secure the United States’ borders along routes of ingress 
from international borders.”294 Effectively, these programs exclude funding for activities 
related to slow-onset disasters even when considered as other threats. 
The remaining 2016 preparedness non disaster grants—Tribal Homeland Security 
Grant Program (THSGP), Non-Profit Security Grant Program (NSGP), Port Security 
Grant Program (PSGP), Intercity Passenger Rail–AMTRAK (IPR) Program, Transit 
Security Grant Program (TSGP), and Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP)—
also include language that limits funding eligibility to terrorism related activities.295 
Figure 13 illustrates the FY 2016 Federal Preparedness Grants. 
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Figure 13.  2016 Federal Preparedness Grants: Authorization, Focus Areas and 
Allocations 
 
The 2015 National Security Strategy states: “Climate change is an urgent and 
growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, 
refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water.”296 However, 
activities related to an increase in natural disasters are eligible for only $350.1 million or 
22 percent of the $1.6 billion allocated for Fiscal Year 2016 Federal Preparedness (Non-
Disaster) Grants. This disparity in funding creates a challenge for state, local, and tribal 
jurisdictions when prioritizing between activities related to terrorism and naturally 
occurring events such as slow-onset disasters.  
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F. MOVING FORWARD: EMERGING INITIATIVES FOR ADDRESSING 
SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS 
Homeland security is defined as “a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland 
that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American 
interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”297 The nation’s coordinated approach to 
homeland security supports this effort through enabling legislations, policies and 
programs. Many of these cannot be applied to slow-onset disasters because of the limiting 
factors of a definitive incident period or an explicit nexus to terrorism. However, recent 
initiatives indicate that changes to this approach are occurring. 
1. Strategic Foresight Initiative 
The Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI) was launched in 2011 by FEMA as a 
collaborative strategic planning effort within the emergency management community. 
The initiative identifies nine drivers for change that are “likely to affect the field of 
emergency management significantly over the next 15 years.”298 It is recommended that 
these drivers be “considered as the emergency management community makes long-term 
plans and decisions.”299 The identified drivers are “Changing role of the individual in 
society, climate change, critical infrastructure, the evolving terrorist threat, global 
interdependencies, government budgets, technological innovation and dependence, 
universal access to and use of information, and U.S. demographic shifts.”300 Figure 14 
illustrates the interconnectedness of the identified drivers for change. 
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Figure 14.  SFI Drivers Interconnection Map301 
Climate change is the only force for change identified as an Environmental 
Driver. Ocean acidification, melting Arctic ice, sea-level rise, and drought are identified 
as a subset of climate change. Therefore, only the correlations between slow-onset 
disasters and their specific impact to the Social and Technological; and Economic and 
Political Drivers are discussed in this chapter.  
a. Social and Technological Drivers 
The Social and Technological Drivers are comprised of U.S. Demographic Shifts, 
Changing Role of the Individual, Technological Innovation and Dependency, and 
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Universal Access to Use of Information. The growing number of the elderly, racially and 
ethnically diverse populations, economic and population growth in metropolitan and 
coastal communities are factors that contribute to the U.S. Demographics Shift driver.302  
Continued population growth in coastal communities will increase development 
of areas that are at risk for flooding caused by sea level rise.303 Emergency managers 
may be faced with changes in the size of their local population due to mass migrations 
into or out of their jurisdictions as a result of drought or coastal flooding. This could also 
be exacerbated by increasingly severe weather in some geographic areas as a result of 
melting Arctic ice’s impact on the North American jet stream.304 An inflow of people 
from mass migration can quickly deplete emergency resources for response and recovery 
activities as during the Dust Bowl.305 Conversely, the outflow of population impacts a 
community’s tax base and can drastically reduce local funding for emergency services.  
Technology has brought about changes in the way individuals interact. As 
presented in the Changing Role of the Individual paper, “Americans are increasingly 
relating to one another in different ways, particularly through online forums.”306 This is 
supported by a Pew Research Center report which found “nearly two-thirds of American 
adults (65 percent) use social networking sites, up from 7 percent when Pew Research 
Center began systematically tracking social media usage in 2005.”307 As a result, there is 
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a growing trend for public safety professionals to use social media for the delivery of 
emergency notifications and public information. Conversely, these same systems can be 
used to gather information on disaster conditions in impacted areas—a method known as 
crowdsourcing.308 The Universal Access to and Use of Information paper cautions the 
use of crowdsourced information because “problems can arise as a result of inaccurate 
and/or unreliable information provided by internet sources. Terrorists or other 
mischievous individuals may post or send false messages.”309 
Social networking relies on technology that is highly vulnerable to failure during 
emergency and non-emergency high-visibility events. This will create additional 
challenges as indicated in the Technological Development and Dependency paper that 
states, “the reliance on technology may also make infrastructure more vulnerable to cyber 
attacks, natural disasters, Electromagnetic Pulse events and solar flares. These types of 
events can knock out the power grid and disable electric/electronic devices.”310 
b. Economic and Political Drivers 
The Economic and Political Drivers are comprised of Critical Infrastructure, 
Government Budgets, Evolving Terrorist Threat, and Global Interdependencies. The 
increasing age of infrastructure in the United States is a significant threat because of the 
number of deficiencies identified in recent years. A report by the American Society of 
Civil Engineers gave the nation’s infrastructure a grade of D+, which falls between 
mediocre and poor. The report also projects an investment of $3.6 trillion by 2020 is 
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needed to remedy this situation.311 The supporting data for the report includes 
deficiencies in the levees, bridges, dams, roads, transit, and energy sectors. In addition, 
the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) states:  
The effects of extreme weather pose a significant risk to critical 
infrastructure—rising sea levels, more severe storms, extreme and 
prolonged drought conditions, and severe flooding combine to threaten 
infrastructure that provides essential services to the American public. 
Ongoing and future changes to the climate have the potential to compound 
these risks and could have a major impact on infrastructure operations.312 
The collapse of bridges, roads, and transportation systems will severely 
compromise successful efforts for mass evacuations from disaster areas. Additionally, the 
growing dependence of the population on the use of technology for emergency 
communications requires sustained efforts to ensure its availability during disasters. 
Overall, the implication for emergency management is that “without reliable 
infrastructure in place, protection, response and recovery operations may suffer.”313  
2. Federal Climate Change Projects 
The Obama Administration has undertaken a number of actions that indicate the 
federal government is re-evaluating its approach to climate change and by extension, 
slow-onset disasters. One is Executive Order 13653—Preparing the United States for the 
Impacts of Climate Change that 
instructs agencies to modernize Federal programs to support climate-
resilient investments, plan for climate change related risks to Federal 
facilities, operations, and programs, and provide the information, data, and 
tools that state, local, and private-sector leaders need to make smart 
decisions to improve preparedness and resilience.314  
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This Executive Order could be applied to the shortfalls identified in homeland 
security policies to address slow-onset disasters—a defined incident period and an 
implicit nexus to terrorism. It orders Federal agencies to 
(i) identify and seek to remove or reform barriers that discourage 
investments or other actions to increase the Nation’s resilience to climate 
change while ensuring continued protection of public health and the 
environment;  
(ii) reform policies and Federal funding programs that may, perhaps 
unintentionally, increase the vulnerability of natural or built systems, 
economic sectors, natural resources, or communities to climate change 
related risks;  
(iii) identify opportunities to support and encourage smarter, more 
climate-resilient investments by States, local communities, and tribes, 
including by providing incentives through agency guidance, grants, 
technical assistance, performance measures, safety considerations, and 
other programs.315 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of the nation’s coordinated approach to 
homeland security and whether or not it adequately addresses slow-onset disasters. I 
found that some aspects of this approach can be applied to slow-onset disasters while 
others cannot. Federal legislation, programs, and funding provide critical resources to 
supplement the efforts of state, local, and tribal jurisdictions to achieve the National 
Preparedness Goal and National Security Strategy. However, fully utilizing these 
resources to address slow-onset disasters is challenging.  
The Code of Federal Regulations stipulates that “no Federal assistance under the 
[Stafford] Act shall be approved unless the damage or hardship to be alleviated resulted 
from the disaster-causing incident which took place during the incident period or was in 
anticipation of that incident.”316 Events that are assessed in the Strategic National Risk 
Assessment have a “distinct beginning and end.”317 Further, all but one of the Federal 
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Preparedness (Non-Disaster) Grant Programs limit funding eligibility to activities “where 
a nexus to terrorism exists.”318  
However, FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative and President Obama’s climate 
change initiatives indicate that slow-onset disasters may yet receive recognition as a 
subset of climate change warranting further attention. The Strategic Foresight Initiative 
has found “the emergency management community may be required to reevaluate how 
services are provided to accommodate the potentially hazardous impacts of climate 
change, and implement comprehensive changes to strategic plans.”319 While Executive 
Order 13653 opens the door for Federal agencies to “modernize Federal programs to 
support climate-resilient investments.”320 
My research reveals that the coordinated approach to homeland security contains 
some internal contradictions. For example, the definition of homeland security calls for 
ensuring a homeland that is “safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other 
hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”321 However, 
our policies and programs predominantly do not address slow-onset disasters as other 
hazards that threaten our interests, aspirations, or way of life. The next chapter presents 
my research conducted to gain an understanding of how this dichotomy in the framing of 
our nation’s coordinated approach to homeland security could occur. 
  
                                                 
318 “Notice of Funding Opportunity, Fiscal Year 2016 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP),” 
United States Department of Homeland Security, 2.  
319 “Climate Change: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency 
Management,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Foresight Initiative, August 2011, 3, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1836-25045-2700/climate_change_paper.pdf. 
320 “Climate Change Resilience,” The White House, Council on Environmental Quality.  
321 “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 13.  
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VI. THE FRAMING OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICIES 
There is a time when we must firmly choose the course we will follow, or 
the relentless drift of events will make the decision for us. 
—Herbert V. Prochnow 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter submits the findings of research to gain an understanding of 
underlying factors that drive the genesis of homeland security policies and how these 
could result in contradictions the nation’s approach to homeland security. The 
frameworks of three experts in the field of homeland security—Kathleen Tierney, Claire 
Rubin and Donald Kettl—were chosen for this undertaking because their work is widely 
known in the homeland security discipline and has been cited in numerous research 
papers and other publications.  
B. IDENTIFYING MAJOR FOCUSING EVENTS FOR CHANGE 
In her introduction to the book Emergency Management: The American 
Experience, 1900–2010, Claire Rubin puts forth the concept that “changes in emergency 
management policies, processes, and authority are event driven. Therefore, major 
focusing events provide an opportunity to explore their effects on emergency 
management principles and practices.”322 The works of the authors in this book provide a 
historical perspective that verifies Rubin’s argument that major focusing events influence 
disaster management practices and policies. According to Rubin, these major focusing 
events share some or all of the characteristics of magnitude, high visibility, unusual 
location, high impact, unique threat agent, surprise, and eligibility for disaster 
declaration.323  
                                                 
322 Claire B. Rubin, “Introduction: 110 Years of Disaster Response in and Emergency Management in 
the United States” in Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010, 2nd ed. Claire B. 
Rubin (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 4, Kindle edition. 
323 Ibid. 
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Magnitude is described as an occurrence that affects a large geographic area or 
large number of people. Events such as 9/11, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy; and the 2011 
Japan tsunami are considered having high visibility as they received extensive media 
coverage; captured the attention of a large audience; and have left a lasting impression on 
the public. Unusual location refers to an event occurring in an area that is not normally 
associated with a specific disaster. High-impact events cause damages that have 
widespread and long-term consequences to the physical, economic, environmental, 
social, and political structures of a community. The use of commercial airplanes as 
weapons during the 9/11 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks is an example of a 
unique threat agent. Surprise, as explained in Rubin’s book, “is often defined as 
unprecedented.”324 Eligibility for disaster declarations refers to whether or not a disaster 
can meet the federal threshold for receiving disaster assistance.  
The contributions of the authors in Rubin’s book support her claim that “virtually 
all major federal laws, executive directives, programs, policies, organizational changes, 
and response systems have resulted from major and catastrophic disasters.”325 However, 
if this was the only framework employed then it would stand that every major and 
catastrophic disaster would generate changes to homeland security practices and policies. 
But historically that has not been the case.  
C. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE KNOWNS, UNKNOWNS AND SYSTEMS 
UNDER STRESS 
Donald Kettl argues in System Under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century 
Governance that changes to political systems happen as a result of the occurrences of 
known and unknown threats and the policy systems reaction to the stress caused by these 
events.326 He proposes that “we get warnings but too often fail to react; we learn lessons 
                                                 
324 Claire B. Rubin, “Introduction: 110 Years of Disaster Response in and Emergency Management in 
the United States,” 4–5.  
325 Ibid., 6–7.  
326 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: CQ Press, SAGE Publications, Ltd., 2014), Kindle edition  
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from previous disasters but fail to prepare.”327 As an explanation for this behavior, he 
begins by quoting Donald Rumsfeld: 
As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know 
there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks 
throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the 
latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.328 
Kettl then goes on to explain that “bureaucracies are created to deal with known 
knowns.”329 Bureaucracies can also be proficient at addressing known unknowns and he 
uses the homeland security discipline’s mitigation and response activities as examples of 
this capability. Communities engage in mitigation activities to reduce the consequences 
of a known threat although the precise location of the impact is unknown. Response 
capabilities are developed using the same principle. However, in the case of the unknown 
unknowns—addressing the unexpected—governments tend not to be as successful.  
Governments’ inability to anticipate the occurrence of an unknown unknown 
results in “policy lightning—what happens when lightning-strike events blow policy off 
course.”330 Kettl cites the BP oil spill as an example of a policy lightning event. The 
government was caught off-guard because “policy was that oil platforms shouldn’t blow 
up, and that private industry was responsible for following carefully prescribed steps and 
installing sophisticated equipment to prevent that from happening.”331 In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, government officials had strong indicators that such a catastrophic 
event could occur. In support of this, Kettl states “it was the worst-case fear of longtime 
emergency planners—precisely the storm FEMA planners had worried about in 2001 and 
for which they had conducted major exercises just the year before.”332 Given these 
circumstances, Hurricane Katrina was a known unknown rather than an unknown 
                                                 
327 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance. location 191.  
328 Ibid., location 223. 
329 Ibid., location 216–227.  
330 Ibid., location 218.  
331 Ibid., location 214.  
332 Ibid., location 431.  
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unknown and government officials should have been better prepared. Then why was 
more not done ahead of time to reduce the impacts?  
Kettl explains this by identifying three issues: 1) there is the problem of collecting 
enough information to make reasoned judgments; 2) there is the risk of backsliding; and 
3) there is calibrating risk—the way people perceive risk.333 In practice, these factors can 
result in government officials operating on “shared lore or on anecdotal experience,”334 
while the public “tend[s] to exaggerate some short-term risks and ignore longer-term 
threats.”335 This is often exacerbated by the public’s tendency to vow to make sure big 
problems that happen do not recur, but we “don’t remember them long enough to follow 
through.”336 
With these counterproductive inclinations, how are policies eventually changed? 
Kettl contends that changes occur as a result of stresses to the policy system. “There is a 
natural tendency toward backsliding—toward resuming the previous equilibrium. When 
big stresses jar the system, it is never likely to retreat back completely to where it was, 
but neither can it maintain a laserlike focus on a single issue.”337 
D. THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF RISK PERCEPTION 
Kathleen Tierney focuses on the social dimensions of risk perception that 
encourage or discourage policy development in her book The Social Roots of Risk: 
Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience.338 In this book, Tierney takes the standpoint 
that causes of disasters and the perception of risks are constructs of the social order and 
therefore, “societies, communities, and organizations have the power to reduce risk and 
                                                 
333 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: The Challenge to 21st Century Governance, location 2144–
2165.  
334 Ibid., location 2177.  
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid., location 3054. 
337 Ibid., location 3296.  
338 Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), location 182, Kindle edition. 
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become more resilient.”339 However, she also proposes that despite having this ability 
people “completely overlook the possibility of statistical ‘outliers’ or rare events that 
have large impacts.”340 According to Tierney, this “stems from the simple and entirely 
understandable fact that perceptions, frames, and social constructions of the world are 
strongly shaped by past experience.”341 This behavior is what underlies the cognitive 
frame Tierney labels the continuity heuristic. 
As defined by Tierney, “The continuity heuristic refers to the tendency of people, 
organizations, and institutions to believe and act as if the future will resemble the past—
or better put, that the future will resemble the past as socially constructed and framed.”342 
This leads societies to trust that “future events can be prepared for and responded to in 
tried-and-true ways based on past experience.”343 As a result society negates the use of 
foresight and instead relies on hindsight. This is a critical oversight when planning for 
future disasters caused by emerging threats due to changing population demographics, 
economic trends and technological advances.344 
Another issue discussed in the Social Roots of Risk is the concept of the tendency 
of “organizations to think primarily in probabilistic rather than ‘possibilistic’ terms.”345 
In probabilistic thinking, the focus is on the “socially constructed likelihood of disaster, 
possibilistic reasoning is concerned with the impacts that could occur as a consequence of 
disaster events…even if those impacts are unlikely.”346 Possibilistic reasoning, therefore, 
focuses not only on what is likely to happen but also on the worst that could happen. The 
failure to respond adequately to Hurricane Katrina is used as an example of the dangers 
of employing probabilistic thinking to disaster planning. 
                                                 
339 Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience, location 
182. 
340 Ibid., location 1301.  
341 Ibid., location 1301–1317.  
342 Ibid., location 1317.  
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid., location 1349.  
345 Ibid., location 1365. 
346 Ibid. 
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It would appear that approaching disasters from the perspective of the continuity 
heuristic (planning based on historical knowledge), when coupled with possibilistic 
reasoning (anticipating the worst that could happen), would result in an operative model 
for the development of effective homeland security policies to reduce the consequences 
of disasters. However, Kathleen Tierney proposes another framework that directly 
counters this model. It is the framework that is based on a cultural mode that “permits 
and even encourages practices that contribute to risk buildup, sometimes inadvertently 
but often intentionally.”347 These practices are most apparent when viewed from the 
perspective of economic and political systems. 
According to Tierney, “local growth machine coalitions exert political power in 
ways that often result in opposition to risk-aware land-use planning and the growth of 
vulnerability in hazardous places.”348 As proof of this behavior, she offers the example of 
local governments that offer incentives and subsidies for land development in areas that 
are prone to flooding. While “levees are touted as offering protection from flooding, even 
in places like Greater New Orleans and the Northern California Delta, where levees offer 
minimal protection at best.”349 This is known as “rent-seeking” and is defined as “the 
fact or practice of manipulating public policy or economic conditions as a strategy for 
increasing profits.”350 In these cases, profits are realized by the promoters “while 
transferring future losses to homeowners, businesses, insurance and reinsurance 
companies, and ultimately taxpayers.”351 Unfortunately, these losses are not limited to 
economics but also result in loss of life, damages to personal property and the 
environment and disruption in the social stability of a community.  
                                                 
347 Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience,  location 
3900–3917.  
348 Ibid., location 3980.  
349 Ibid. 
350 Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “rent-seeking,” accessed March 6, 2016, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/rent-seeking?q=rent+seeking. 
351 Kathleen Tierney, The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience, location 
3980.  
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E. A REVIEW OF THE PROGRESSION OF SIGNIFICANT HOMELAND 
SECURITY POLICIES 
Since the early 1800s, disasters have been the driving force for the evolution of 
homeland security practices, authorities and policies. The examples in Table 8 provide a 
historical perspective showing the correlation between major disasters and changes in the 
homeland security discipline. It is not intended to reflect the entire spectrum of 
authorities related to this discipline.  
Table 8.   Progression of Significant Homeland Security Policies 
Year Event Result 
1803 Portsmouth NH 
Fire 
Federal Disaster Loans for Repair and 
Reconstruction of public structures. 
1927 Great Mississippi 
Flood of 1928 
Flood Control Act of 1928—authorizes the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to design and construct 
projects “for the control of the floods of the 






Flood Control Act of 1936 increases the authority 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design and 






Federal Disaster Assistance Administration—
established by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, allows housing and other 
forms of disaster aid.  
1965 Hurricane Betsy 
 
Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act 
of 1968 that allows federally guaranteed flood 
insurance for homeowners. 
1971 San Fernando 
Earthquake of 
1971 
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 
1977—enacted to reduce the risk to earthquakes by 
establishing and maintaining an earthquake 
hazards reduction program. 





Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973—requires 
purchase of a flood insurance policy by anyone 
receiving federally related financing involving 
flood prone property.  
                                                 
352 Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 ( 33 U.S.C. 702a et seq.), May 15, 1928, accessed 
July 5, 2015, http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/Portals/52/docs/MRC/ 
Appendix_E._1928_Flood_Control_Act.pdf. 
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Year Event Result 
1974 “Terrible 
Tuesday”—
Tornadoes in 10 
States 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974—establishes the 








Executive order 12127, April 1979—President 
Carter establishes the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.353 
1988 Mount St. 
Helen’s Eruption 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act—amends the Disaster Relief Act of 
1974, establishes the Federal 75% and Non-
Federal 25% cost share for Federal public disaster 
assistance programs, provides States and local 
jurisdictions funding for disaster management, 
provides hazard mitigation grant funding, and 




Emergency Management Assistance Compact—
national mutual aid agreements between states that 
was signed into law in 1996. 
1993 Great Midwest 
Floods of 1993 
National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994—
creates the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program 




Project Impact—encouraged communities to adopt 
better building practices and codes, and to develop 
community and private-sector involvement. 
1995 Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building 
Bombing 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996—requires Department of Justice and FEMA 
to train metropolitan firefighters who respond to 
incidents caused by weapons of mass destruction. 
2001 9/11 World Trade 
Center/Pentagon 
Attacks 
Homeland Security Act of 2002—Creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security 2003 and 
transfers the functions of FEMA to DHS’ 




Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006—
amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
Establishes FEMA as a distinct agency within 
                                                 
353 President Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency by consolidating several 
agencies. For more information on these agencies see page 7 in the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency Publication 1, November 2010, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-
8164/pub_1_final.pdf. 
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Year Event Result 
DHS.  
2013 Hurricane Sandy Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013—
revises the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act.354 
 
Each of the examples in Table 8 support the underlying premise in the policy 
framework’s discussed above, that homeland security in the United States historically 
takes a retro-focused approach and practitioners plan and make changes based on the 
lessons learned in the last great disaster. There is a clear correlation that these disasters 
meet some, if not all, of Claire Rubin’s major focusing events as catalysts for change. 
They also confirm Donald Kettl’s principle that change is brought about by stresses to the 
political system and his assertion that bureaucracies do not adequately address unknown 
unknowns and, therefore, we are destined to repeatedly experience catastrophic 
consequences from disasters. Some of these authorities and policies were developed 
using probabilistic reasoning and rent-seeking as described in Tierney’s philosophy. 
These also verify Kettl’s premise of the inadequacy of preparation for unknown 
unknowns. This is especially true when considering policies governing flood control 
projects in the United States. 
The approach taken in the early days of flood control are examples of the 
application of these principles. In 1824, the Supreme Court ruled “that it was 
constitutional for the federal government to finance and construct river 
improvements.”355 This decision led to a number of initiatives including the Flood 
Control Act of 1936 that authorized flood control projects and “reflected a philosophy 
                                                 
354 The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 revised the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act most notably by establishing new alternative procedures for administering the 
Public Assistance program; revising the provisions of the Hazard Mitigation Grant program to allow for 25 
percent of funding to be advanced; directing FEMA to update the factors considered when assessing the 
need for Individual Assistance in the declaration process; and authorizing the chief executive of a tribal 
government to request disaster or emergency declarations directly from the president. Information on the 
act can be found at the Library of Congress, accessed October 18, 2013, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/
house-bill/219. 
355 David Butler, “The Expanding Role of the Federal Government: 1927–1950,”in Emergency 
Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010, 2nd ed., ed. Claire B. Rubin (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2012), 52, Kindle edition. 
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that man could control nature, thereby eliminating the risk of floods.”356 Some of the 
structures constructed as flood control measures such as “levees represent a particular 
challenge in that they may encourage development in flood-prone areas, but sometimes 
fail or are overtopped by significant storms.”357 Paradoxically, “the Nation’s risk in terms 
of lives lost, economic disruption, and property damage is increased by overconfidence in 
the level and reliability of structural flood protection.”358 This overconfidence was 
proved ill-advised when devastating riverine floods impacted the Midwest in 1993 and 
2008; and again during coastal flooding in Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Many of the flood 
control systems within the United States:  
Were built decades ago using the available data, technologies, and 
scientific knowledge of the period that may have underestimated flood 
hazards for particular areas. Similarly, there are issues with changes in risk 
over time due to processes such as land loss, subsidence, sea-level rise, 
reduced natural buffers, urban development and infrastructure aging.359  
This is compounded by the practice of constructing levee systems and floodwalls 
to withstand a 1 percent-annual-chance flood (also known as a 100-year flood)360 and/or 
a Category 3 hurricane.361 In the Midwest Flood of 1993, 1,083 levees failed or 
overtopped362 contributing to 48 deaths, economic losses of $30.2 billion, and more than 
                                                 
356 George D. Haddow and Jane A. Bullock, Introduction to Emergency Management, 2nd ed. 
(Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006), 2. 
357 Betsy A. Cody and Nicole T. Carter, Flood Risk Management and Levees: A Federal Primer (CRS 
Report No. RL33129) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), summary, accessed July 
7, 2015 http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc94013/m1/1/high_res_d/RL33129_2008Jun20.pdf. 
358 Ibid., 6.  
359 Ibid., 7.  
360 The United States Geological Survey explanation of a 100-year flood: “The term ‘100-year flood’ 
is misleading because it leads people to believe that it happens only once every 100 years. The truth is that 
an uncommonly big flood can happen any year. The term ‘100-year flood’ is really a statistical designation, 
and there is a 1-in-100 chance that a flood this size will happen during any year. Perhaps a better term 
would be the ‘1-in-100 chance flood,’” accessed July 7, 2015, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/FS-229-96/. 
361 Betsy A. Cody, Flood Risk Management and Levees: A Federal Primer, 5–6. 
362 The number of failed or overtopped levees was compiled from data presented by Lee W. Larson, 
NOAA/National Weather Service “Great USA Flood of 1993,” paper presented at the IAHS Conference, 
Anaheim CA, June 24–28, 1996, http://www.nwrfc.noaa.gov/floods/papers/oh_2/great.htm. 
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70,000 homes damaged.363 During the 2008 flood “41 levees overtopped.”364 Although 
the losses were less than in 1993, they were still significant and are estimated at $15.0 
billion with 24 deaths.”365  
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is another example. “The failure of levees and 
floodwalls that protect the City of New Orleans resulted in catastrophic flooding in the 
Greater New Orleans area, with floodwaters in many areas up to 8 feet above the lowest 
floor of the building.”366 It is reported that in “New Orleans alone, 134,000 housing 
units—70 percent of all occupied units—suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina and 
the subsequent flooding.”367 The loss of life that is attributed to Katrina is staggering:  
Sixty-five percent of the Hurricane Katrina victims in Louisiana died of 
injury or drowning. The majority of these deaths occurred in Eastern 
Orleans Parish, specifically the lower ninth ward; in Lakeview and 
Gentilly, adjacent to Lake Pontchartrain; and in St. Bernard Parish. 
Drowning and injury-related deaths occurred predominantly near levee 
infrastructure breaches.368 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the frameworks of three policy experts in the field of 
homeland security. Each of them asserts that the genesis of authorities, policies, and 
practices follow a long-standing tradition of planning based on the last major disaster. 
Claire Rubin proposes that policy development occurs as a result of incidents that share 
some or all of the characteristics she identifies as intrinsic to major focusing events for 
                                                 
363 Nicole T. Carter, Federal Flood Policy Challenges: Lessons from the 2008 Midwest Flood (CRS 
Report No. R40201) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 8, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.floods.org/PDF/2008_MidwestFloods/
CR_Lessons_Learned_from_the_2008_Midwest_Flood.pdf.  
364 Ibid., 11.  
365 Nicole T. Carter, Federal Flood Policy Challenges: Lessons from the 2008 Midwest Flood, 8.  
366 “Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast: Mitigation Assessment Team Report, Building Performance 
Observations, Recommendations and Technical Guidance,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
FEMA 549/July 2006, vi, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1520-20490-4067/
549_cvr_toc.pdf. 
367 Allison Plyer, “Facts for Features: Katrina Impact,” The Data Center, accessed July 7, 2015. 
http://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/. 
368 Joan Brunkard, Gonza Namulanda, and Raoult Ratard, “Hurricane Katrina Deaths, Louisiana, 
2005,” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness (August 28, 2008): 3, 
http://www.dhh.state.la.us/assets/docs/katrina/deceasedreports/KatrinaDeaths_082008.pdf. 
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change. Kathleen Tierney approaches policy development from the standpoint that 
changes are generated based on a society’s perception of risk that encourages 
probabilistic rather than possibilistic reasoning. She also contends that this behavior, 
when coupled with the practice of rent-seeking, results in catastrophic consequences that 
could otherwise have been avoided.  
Finally, Donald Kettl also takes the position that changes are dependent on the 
perception of risk. He then argues changes are fashioned by stresses to the policy system. 
However, despite the stress agent, governments continue to be adept at planning for 
known knowns and known unknowns but prove inadequate in addressing unknown 
unknowns. This argument highlights a lack of foresight in disaster planning that echo’s 
Tierney’s probabilistic reasoning frame.  
The next and concluding chapter presents my findings and recommendations as a 
result of conducting research to answer this question: Are slow-onset disasters adequately 
addressed within the homeland security discipline?  
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VII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
AND CLOSING THOUGHTS 




The genesis of the research that culminates in this thesis was to gain a deeper 
understanding of slow-onset disasters and whether they pose an emerging and distinct 
threat to our nation. My quest for answers began when I discovered trends associated 
with climate change are recognized as threats to homeland security.369 These threats 
include natural disasters with a defined incident period that occur with little or no 
warning, such as hurricanes, floods, and winter storms. Each of these is widely 
recognized by the emergency management community and are adequately addressed by 
current homeland security policies and practices. However, the State-by-State Reports: 
President Obama’s Plan to Cut Carbon Pollution and Prepare for Consequences of 
Climate Change370 published in April 2014 also identifies emerging threats that do not 
fall within the same category. My interest in these threats led me to identify a subset as 
slow-onset disasters for further study—melting Arctic ice, drought, ocean acidification, 
and sea-level rise. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Slow-Onset Disasters Pose a Threat Homeland Security 
Slow-onset disasters demonstrate early warning signs, take years to fully emerge, 
and trigger cascading consequences beyond primary impact zones. An analysis of 
existing literature on melting Arctic ice, drought, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise 
                                                 
369 “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,” United States Department of Homeland 
Security, 21–22.  
370 “State-by-State Reports: President Obama’s Plan to Cut Carbon Pollution and Prepare for 
Consequences of Climate Change,” The White House. 
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validates the direct threats they pose to the social, physical, and economic stability of 
local communities. This information was also used for a risk assessment that reveals 
drought and sea-level rise pose credible threats to the critical infrastructure lifeline 
sectors. This finding is significant because these sectors provide “indispensable services 
that enable the continuous operation of critical business and government functions, and 
would risk human health and safety or national and economic security if compromised or 
not promptly restored.”371  
2. The Nation’s Approach to Homeland Security Does Not Adequately 
Address Slow-Onset Disasters 
Following my determination of the verifiable threats these hazards pose, I 
performed an analysis of current homeland security policies to ascertain whether or not 
they adequately addressed these hazards. This analysis reveals internal contradictions in 
the nation’s approach to homeland security hinders activities to protect against, respond 
to, and recover from disasters caused by melting Arctic ice, drought, ocean acidification, 
and sea-level rise. This conclusion is based on two findings.  
First, the Stafford Act identifies a major disaster as “any natural catastrophe…in 
any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage 
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this 
Act.”372 The implementing regulations for the Stafford Act, Emergency Management and 
Assistance, 44 CFR §206.32(f) limits disaster assistance to damages that occurred during 
“the incident period or was in anticipation of that incident.”373 This precludes slow-onset 
disasters from receiving a disaster declaration under the Stafford Act because of the 
difficulty in identifying a definitive incident period due to their characteristic of slow 
emergence.  
Second, homeland security is defined as “a concerted national effort to ensure a 
homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where 
                                                 
371 “Strengthening Regional Resilience, Final Report and Recommendations,” National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council, November 21, 2013, 14.  
372 Ibid., 6. 
373 Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 CFR §206.32(f) (2002).  
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American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”374 The National Preparedness 
Goal is to achieve “a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”375 State, local, and tribal jurisdictions are 
eligible to receive funding through the Homeland Security Grant Program “to prevent 
terrorism and other catastrophic events and to prepare the nation for the threats and 
hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States.”376 Chapters II and 
IV validate slow-onset disasters as threats to “American interests, aspirations and way of 
life.”377 Therefore, the definition and goal should apply to slow-onset disasters. 
However, the Strategic National Risk Assessment that was performed to identify the 
“greatest risk to the security of the Nation”378 excluded slow-onset disasters because they 
do not have a “distinct beginning and end.”379 The 2015 National Security Strategy 
identified climate change as “an urgent and growing threat to our national 
security…contributing to increased natural disasters.”380 Yet only 22 percent of the $1.6 
billion allocated for the Fiscal Year 2016 federal preparedness grants could be used for 
melting Arctic ice, drought, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise that are associated with 
climate change. The remaining funding is either limited to protecting our borders; direct 
counter-terrorism activities; or for activities “where a nexus to terrorism exists.”381  
                                                 
374 “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2010, 13.  
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3. The Framing of Homeland Security Policies 
Chapter VI presents my research on the work of three experts in the field of 
homeland security—Claire Rubin, Donald Kettl, and Kathleen Tierney—to determine 
how contradictions in the nation’s approach to homeland security could occur. Each 
agree that homeland security authorities, policies, and practices follow a retro-focused 
approach of planning for the next disaster based on the events of the last. This behavior is 
defined by Kathleen Tierney as the continuity heuristic, “the tendency of people, 
organizations, and institutions to believe and act as if the future will resemble the 
past.”382 Claire Rubin’s principle of major focusing events for change complements this 
concept by proposing “virtually all major federal laws, executive directives, programs, 
policies, organizational changes, and response systems have resulted from major and 
catastrophic disasters.”383 Donald Kettl’s work also supports the retro-focused approach 
with his theory that changes occur as result of a policy system’s reaction to stress.384 
Chapter V of this work verifies a retro-focused framework underlies our nation’s 
approach to homeland security. In one case, our experience with natural disasters has led 
us to the expectation that disasters will always have a distinct incident period. In the 
other, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have created an environment where the availability of 
resources to counter the threats of terrorism surpasses those for natural disasters. 
Federal policies are also framed using probabilistic thinking and focuses primarily 
on a “socially constructed likelihood of disaster.”385 This perspective leads disaster 
planners to consider what is most likely to happen based on a society’s risk perception. 
Consequence management of slow-onset disasters is an emerging issue that deserves the 
attention of emergency management professionals. However, the many unknown 
unknowns associated with their consequences require possibilistic reasoning to develop 
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policies and approaches that consider not only the likelihood of an occurrence but also 
the worst that could happen.  
4. Indicators of Change in the Nation’s Approach to Slow-Onset 
Disasters 
FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative is a strategic planning effort within the 
emergency management community. In 2011, the initiative identified nine drivers for 
change that are “likely to affect the field of emergency management significantly over the 
next 15 years.”386 As I discussed in Chapter V, emergency management is a critical 
component of the homeland security discipline because it creates the frameworks to 
reduce our vulnerabilities to threats and builds our resiliency so we can recover.387 
Therefore, these nine drivers will also impact the homeland security discipline. Climate 
change is one of identified drivers.  
Since the findings of the Strategic Foresight Initiative were published there have 
been indications that the federal government is re-evaluating its approach to climate 
change. This statement is substantiated by several actions. Executive Order 13653: 
Preparing the United States for the Impact of Climate Change was issued in 2013 and 
directs federal agencies “to take a series of steps to make it easier for American 
communities to strengthen their resilience to extreme weather and prepare for other 
impacts of climate change.”388 The Executive Order specifically identifies: removing 
barriers to investments for building resiliency to climate change; reforming policies and 
federal funding programs that increase vulnerability to climate change; and providing 
incentives for climate-resilient investments.389 The 2015 Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program includes the provision for mitigation projects to address “more powerful storms, 
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frequent heavy precipitation, heat waves, prolonged droughts, extreme flooding, higher 
sea levels, and other weather events.”390 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current events indicate the federal government is reconsidering its approach to 
climate change including consideration of slow-onset disasters. However, the thought 
processes that were used in the past for homeland security policies must be reframed if 
this endeavor is to be successful. The emerging threats presented by slow-onset disasters 
require a future-focused framework rather than the continuity heuristic. This is critical at 
this juncture because of the emerging drivers for change identified by the Strategic 
Foresight Initiative: changing population demographics, economic trends and 
technological advances. Instead of probabilistic thinking, disaster planners must now 
apply possibilistic reasoning to fully anticipate the worst that can happen as a result of the 
cascading consequences from melting Arctic ice, drought, ocean acidification and sea 
level rise. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
My research is only one effort to categorize the threats posed to homeland 
security by climate change. Other aspects of climate change and its implications for 
homeland security still warrant future research. Two of these are identified in the 2014 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review—climate change induced pandemics and 
climate change as threat multipliers for terrorist activities.391 The validity of both topics 
is still hotly debated within the homeland security discipline. Future research could 
resolve the issue. Instead of arguing these issues precious time would be saved, which 
could be used, to become more prepared to safeguard our nation against credible threats 
to our security. 
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E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The principles of emergency management rest on the belief that all disasters start 
at the local level, as do the activities taken for prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery. However, the direct and indirect consequences of slow-onset 
disasters span large geographic areas and crosses jurisdictional boundaries. This requires 
the homeland security community to consider activities beyond a local perspective. A 
National Academies of Science report supports this approach when it cautions that “an 
uncoordinated approach to [climate change] adaptation in the United States would result 
in a patchwork of activities that may lead to unintended consequences, conflicting 
mandates, and potential maladaptations.”392  
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